Using the phenomenon of public interest litigation (PIL) as the primary focus of analysis, this book explores the manner in which the judicial branch of government in the three East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda has engaged with questions traditionally off-limits to adjudication and court-based resolution. It is rooted in an incisive investigation of the history of politics and governance in the sub-region, accompanied by an extensive repertoire of judicial decisions. It also provides a critical and informative account of the manner in which courts of law have engaged with State power in a bid to alternatively deliver or subvert justice to the socially marginalized and the politically victimized. The focus of the book is on judicial struggles over sexual and gender-based discrimination, social justice and poverty, and the adjudication of presidential elections. Employing the device of case deconstruction and analysis, the study uncovers the conceptual and structural factors which have witnessed public interest litigation emerge as a critical factor in the struggle for more inclusive and equitable structures of governance and social order. Needless to say, as judges battle with time-honoured legal precedents, received dogmas and contending (and often antagonistic) societal forces, the struggle in the courts is neither straightforward nor necessarily always transformative.

Judges have enormous power. They determine whom we can marry, whether we can own firearms, whether the government can mandate that we buy certain products, and how we define "personhood." But who gets to occupy these powerful positions? Up until now, there has been little systematic study of what type of judges get confirmed. In his rigorous yet readable style, John Lott analyzes both historical accounts and large amounts of data to see how the confirmation process has changed over time. Most importantly, Dumbing Down the Courts shows that intelligence has now become a liability for judicial nominees. With courts taking on an ever greater role in our lives, smarter judges are feared by the opposition. Although presidents want brilliant judges who support their positions, senators of the opposing party increasingly "Bork" those nominees who would be the most influential judges, subjecting them to humiliating and long confirmations. The conclusion? The brightest nominees will not end

Using the phenomenon of public interest litigation (PIL) as the primary focus of analysis, this book explores the manner in which the judicial branch of government in the three East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda has engaged with questions traditionally off-limits to adjudication and court-based resolution. It is rooted in an incisive investigation of the history of politics and governance in the sub-region, accompanied by an extensive repertoire of judicial decisions. It also provides a critical and informative account of the manner in which courts of law have engaged with State power in a bid to alternatively deliver or subvert justice to the socially marginalized and the politically victimized. The focus of the book is on judicial struggles over sexual and gender-based discrimination, social justice and poverty, and the adjudication of presidential elections. Employing the device of case deconstruction and analysis, the study uncovers the conceptual and structural factors which have witnessed public interest litigation emerge as a critical factor in the struggle for more inclusive and equitable structures of governance and social order. Needless to say, as judges battle with time-honoured legal precedents, received dogmas and contending (and often antagonistic) societal forces, the struggle in the courts is neither straightforward nor necessarily always transformative.

This comprehensive book compares the intersection of political forces and legal practices in five industrial nations--the United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan. The authors, eminent political scientists and legal scholars, investigate how constitutional courts function in each country, how the adjudication of criminal justice and the processing of civil disputes connect legal systems to politics, and how both ordinary citizens and large corporations use the courts. For each of the five countries, the authors discuss the structure of courts and access to them, the manner in which politics and law are differentiated or amalgamated, whether judicial posts are political prizes or bureaucratic positions, the ways in which courts are perceived as legitimate forms for addressing political conflicts, the degree of legal consciousness among citizens, the kinds of work lawyers do, and the manner in which law and courts are used as social control mechanisms. The authors find that although the extent to which courts participate in policymaking varies dramatically from country to country, judicial responsiveness to perceived public problems is not a uniquely American phenomenon.

Schools, welfare agencies, and a wide variety of other state and local institutions of vital importance to citizens are actually controlled by attorneys and judges rather than governors and mayors. In this valuable book, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod explain how this has come to pass, why it has resulted in service to the public that is worse, not better, and what can be done to restore control of these programs to democratically elected—and accountable—officials. Sandler and Schoenbrod tell how the courts, with the best intentions and often with the approval of elected officials, came to control ordinary policy making through court decrees. These court regimes, they assert, impose rigid and often ancient detailed plans that can founder on reality. Newly elected officials, who may wish to alter the plans in response to the changing wishes of voters, cannot do so unless attorneys, court-appointed functionaries, and lower-echelon officials agree. The result is neither judicial government nor good government, say Sandler and Schoenbrod, and they offer practical reforms that would set governments free from this judicial stranglehold, allow courts to do their legitimate job of protecting rights, and strengthen democracy.

This book examines how the judicialization of politics, and the politicization of courts, affect representative democracy, rule of law, and separation of powers. This volume critically assesses the phenomena of judicialization of politics and politicization of the judiciary. It explores the rising impact of courts on key constitutional principles, such as democracy and separation of powers, which is paralleled by increasing criticism of this influence from both liberal and illiberal perspectives. The book also addresses the challenges to rule of law as a principle, preconditioned on independent and powerful courts, which are triggered by both democratic backsliding and the mushrooming of populist constitutionalism and illiberal constitutional regimes. Presenting a wide range of case studies, the book will be a valuable resource for students and academics in constitutional law and political science seeking to understand the increasingly complex relationships between the judiciary, executive and legislature.

Offers an analysis of the politics of court reform through a focused review of Indonesia's complex court system.