What makes a bank systemically important? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session ... July 16, 2014.

What makes a bank systemically important? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session ... July 16, 2014.

Interconnectedness among global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and global systemically important insurers (GSIIs) has important financial stability implications. This paper examines connectedness among United States, European and Asian GSIBs and GSIIs, using publicly-available daily equity returns and intra-day volatility data from October 2007 to August 2016. Results reveal strong regional clusters of return and volatility connectedness amongst GSIBs and GSIIs. Compared to Asia, selected GSIBs and GSIIs headquartered in the United States and Europe appear to be main sources of market-based connectedness. Total system connectedness—i.e., among all GSIBs and GSIIs—tends to rise during financial stress, which is corroborated by a balance sheet oriented systemic risk measure. Lastly, the paper demonstrates significant influence of economic policy uncertainty and U.S. long-term interest rates on total connectedness among systemically important institutions, and the important role of bank profitability and asset quality in driving bank-specific return connectedness.

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.

Seminar paper from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - International Economic Relations, grade: 1,0, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (Professur für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Wirtschaftspolitik und Internationale Makroökonomik Prof. Dr. Beatrice Weder di Mauro ), language: English, abstract: As a result of the worldwide financial crisis which occurred in 2007, an intensive discussion about preventing possible future crisis like that has arisen. One of the key points in these debates is the necessity to protect the economy from negative effects of failing financial institutions. These can be dramatic what you can see by reflecting the facts of the recent crisis that is characterized by big bank failures and so caused domino effects. Thus it is very important to reduce the so called systemic relevance of financial institutions. But the design of a framework that contains systemic risk effectively is not just a simple task, because you have to consider a couple of factors in view of creating an effective solution. This paper presents a short overview of the issue of hazard that is caused by systemic relevant institutions (SIFI) and the content of the actual debate by illustrating the costs the institutions cause and the presentation and evaluation of several approaches of economic experts with regard to the topic of reducing systemic relevance. Finally the paper tries to draw a conclusion.