Macro statistics on foreign direct investment (FDI) are blurred by offshore centers with enormous inward and outward investment positions. This paper uses several new data sources, both macro and micro, to estimate the global FDI network while disentangling real investment and phantom investment and allocating real investment to ultimate investor economies. We find that phantom investment into corporate shells with no substance and no real links to the local economy may account for almost 40 percent of global FDI. Ignoring phantom investment and allocating real investment to ultimate investors increases the explanatory power of standard gravity variables by around 25 percent.

Macro statistics on foreign direct investment (FDI) are blurred by offshore centers with enormous inward and outward investment positions. This paper uses several new data sources, both macro and micro, to estimate the global FDI network while disentangling real investment and phantom investment and allocating real investment to ultimate investor economies. We find that phantom investment into corporate shells with no substance and no real links to the local economy may account for almost 40 percent of global FDI. Ignoring phantom investment and allocating real investment to ultimate investors increases the explanatory power of standard gravity variables by around 25 percent.

Over the past twenty years, foreign direct investments have spurred widespread liberalization of the foreign direct investment (FDI) regulatory framework. By opening up to foreign investors and encouraging FDI, which could result in increased capital and market access, many countries have improved the operational conditions for foreign affiliates and strengthened standards of treatment and protection. By assuring investors that their investment will be legally protected with closed bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs), this in turn creates greater interest in FDI.

This book presents the results of a groundbreaking study on ‘spillovers’ of knowledge and technology from global value-chain oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa, and discusses implications for policymakers hoping to harness the power of FDI for economic development.

In 2010, the Latin American and Caribbean region showed great resilience to the international financial crisis and became the world region with the fastest-growing flows of both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI). The upswing in FDI in the region has occurred in a context in which developing countries in general have taken on a greater share in both inward and outward FDI flows. This briefing paper is divided into five sections. The first offers a regional overview of FDI in 2010. The second examines FDI trends in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic. The third describes the presence China is beginning to build up as an investor in the region. Lastly, the fourth and fifth sections analyze the main foreign investments and business strategies in the telecommunications and software sectors, respectively.

This paper addresses three types of geographical decoupling in foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e., challenges when using traditional FDI data as a proxy for real economic integration between economies: (i) large bilateral asymmetries between inward and outward FDI, (ii) the role of special purpose entities (SPEs), and (iii) the effect of moving from immediate counterpart to ultimate investing economy (UIE). A unique global FDI network is estimated, where SPEs are removed and FDI positions are broken down by the UIE. Total inward FDI in the new network is reduced by one-third, and financial centers are less dominant.

Recent changes in technology, along with the opening up of many regions previously closed to investment, have led to explosive growth in the international movement of capital. Flows from foreign direct investment and debt and equity financing can bring countries substantial gains by augmenting local savings and by improving technology and incentives. Investing companies acquire market access, lower cost inputs, and opportunities for profitable introductions of production methods in the countries where they invest. But, as was underscored recently by the economic and financial crises in several Asian countries, capital flows can also bring risks. Although there is no simple explanation of the currency crisis in Asia, it is clear that fixed exchange rates and chronic deficits increased the likelihood of a breakdown. Similarly, during the 1970s, the United States and other industrial countries loaned OPEC surpluses to borrowers in Latin America. But when the U.S. Federal Reserve raised interest rates to control soaring inflation, the result was a widespread debt moratorium in Latin America as many countries throughout the region struggled to pay the high interest on their foreign loans. International Capital Flows contains recent work by eminent scholars and practitioners on the experience of capital flows to Latin America, Asia, and eastern Europe. These papers discuss the role of banks, equity markets, and foreign direct investment in international capital flows, and the risks that investors and others face with these transactions. By focusing on capital flows' productivity and determinants, and the policy issues they raise, this collection is a valuable resource for economists, policymakers, and financial market participants.