No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.

What can the international community do to prevent financial contagion?

Despite the growing popularity of blaming 'contagion' for international financial crises, contagion remains an elusive concern. Without a clear understanding of financial contagion and the mechanisms through which it works, we can neither assess the problem nor design appropriate policy measures to control it. This paper organizes and evaluates recent research on international financial contagion. The main finding is that the different mechanisms by which a crisis can spread greatly differ from each other both in their causes and implications. Policy measures that do not take these differences into account may do more harm than good.

This book tackles these factors theoretically, providing an intellectually satisfying framework for the understanding of financial contagion."--Jacket.

This book is an authoritative account of the economic and political roots of the 2008 financial crisis. It examines why it was triggered in the United States, why it morphed into the Great Recession, and why the contagion spread with such ferocity around the globe. It also examines how and why economies - including the Eurozone, Russia, China, India, East Asia, and the Middle East - have been impacted and explores their response to the unprecedented challenges of the crisis and the effectiveness of their policy measures. Global Financial Contagion specifically looks at how the Obama administration's policy missteps have contributed to America's huge debt and slow recovery, why the Eurozone's response to its existential crisis has become a never-ending saga, and why the G-20's efforts to create a new international financial architecture may fall short. This book will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.

An argument that contagion is the most significant risk facing the financial system and that Dodd¬Frank has reduced the government's ability to respond effectively. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd–Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis—that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion.

The analysis of interconnectedness and contagion is an important part of the financial stability and risk assessment of a country’s financial system. This paper offers detailed and practical guidance on how to conduct a comprehensive analysis of interconnectedness and contagion for a country’s financial system under various circumstances. We survey current approaches at the IMF for analyzing interconnectedness within the interbank, cross-sector and cross-border dimensions through an overview and examples of the data and methodologies used in the Financial Sector Assessment Program. Finally, this paper offers practical advice on how to interpret results and discusses potential financial stability policy recommendations that can be drawn from this type of in-depth analysis.