In the study of language, as in any other systematic study, there is no neutral terminology. Every technical term is an expression of the assumptions and theoretical presuppositions of its users; and in this introduction, we want to clarify some of the issues that have surrounded the assumptions behind the use of the two terms "speech acts" and "pragmatics". The notion of a speech act is fairly well understood. The theory of speech acts starts with the assumption that the minimal unit of human communica tion is not a sentence or other expression, but rather the performance of certain kinds of acts, such as making statements, asking questions, giving orders, describing, explaining, apologizing, thanking, congratulating, etc. Characteristically, a speaker performs one or more of these acts by uttering a sentence or sentences; but the act itself is not to be confused with a sentence or other expression uttered in its performance. Such types of acts as those exemplified above are called, following Austin, illocutionary acts, and they are standardly contrasted in the literature with certain other types of acts such as perlocutionary acts and propositional acts. Perlocutionary acts have to do with those effects which our utterances have on hearers which go beyond the hearer's understanding of the utterance. Such acts as convincing, persuading, annoying, amusing, and frightening are all cases of perlocutionary acts.

'This small but tightly packed volume is easily the most substantial discussion of speech acts since John Austin's How To Do Things With Words and one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language in recent decades.'--Philosophical Quarterly

A direct successor to Searle's Speech Acts (C.U.P. 1969), Expression and Meaning refines earlier analyses and extends speech-act theory to new areas including indirect and figurative discourse, metaphor and fiction.

Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject English Language and Literature Studies - Linguistics, grade: 1,5, , language: English, abstract: John R. Searle was born in 1932 in Denver, Colorado. In his article What is a Speech Act? Searle develops a “theory in the philosophy of a language, according to which speaking in a language is a matter of performing illocutionary acts with certain intentions, according to constitutive rules (Grewendorf / Meggle 2002: 4). The following paper will deal with the ideas on speech acts developed in Searle’s article. First, a fundamental understanding of the assumptions Searle’s theory is based on will be provided. There will be a brief introduction to the theories of J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice, whom Searle’s article was mostly influenced by. Grice’s Meaning and Austin’s How to do things with words will constitute the reading mostly consulted. After providing a basis for Searle’s theory, his article What is a Speech Act? will be looked at in detail. The examinations will include Searle’s distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules and his introduction of the notions ‘proposition-indicating element’ and ‘function-indicating device’, as derived from ‘illocutionary act’ and ‘propositional content of an illocutionary act’. The focus will then be on Searle’s conditions for the illocutionary act of promising, and the rules for the use of the function-indicating device for promising, which he derives from these conditions. There will finally be a brief overview on revisions and amendments Searle developed on his theory after 1965. These include a more detailed classification of speech acts and a distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning.

Any study of communication must take into account the nature and role of speech acts in a broad context. This book addresses questions such as: - What do we mean? - How do we say it? and - How is it understood? in the broad context of universal, socio-cultural and psychological issues that bear on human communication. It presents an overview of current issues in speech act theory that are at the center of human and social sciences dealing with language, thought and action, building on John Searle's famous article 'How Performatives Work' (included in this book). The contributions by linguists, psychologists, computer scientists, and philosophers thus address issues of communication that are crucial in conversation analysis, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, psychology and philosophy, and a general understanding of how we communicate. The book is suitable for courses with an extensive bibliography for further reading and an Index.

Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of J.R. Searle (Foundations of Communication and Cognition).