Jac Weller studies every move and counter-move of the battle, recreating not only the actions and tactics of the two great leaders but the epic engagements and clashes between the troops themselves that were pivotal for the victory or defeat. The author also studies the related battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny. He takes the reader with him onto the battlefield of Waterloo, a terrain whose features are still recongnisable today, and which is bought to life for the reader by detailed maps and by the authors vivid and riveting descriptions of the progress of the fighting.This completely original approach, appreciated by the Times Literary Supplement on the books first publication, strikes as fresh today, and this new edition, with an introduction specially written for it by the author, will be eagerly read by military enthusiasts and general reader alike.

A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.

During the Waterloo Campaign, Wellington had only one division that was composed entirely of British infantry, the 1st Division. This consisted of two brigades of the most famous regiments of the British Army the three regiments of Guards.The exploits of the Guards at Waterloo have passed into legend. On that day, Wellington entrusted the most crucial part of his line to the men he knew would hold their position at all cost. That vital position was the Chteau d'Hougoumont, and those men were the Guards.As the great battle unfolded, the French threw more and more troops at the walls of Hougoumont, setting some of the Chteaus buildings on fire and almost forcing their way in through its northern gateway. Though almost an entire French corps was engaged in the struggle for Hougoumont, the detachment of the Guards valiantly resisted every attack.Then, as the battle reached its climax, Napoleon launched his Imperial Guard at the centre of Wellingtons line. Just as the French believed that victory was in their grasp, up stood the 1st Guards Brigade to deliver a devastating volley, followed by a ferocious bayonet charge from which the French never recovered.The experienced duo of Robert Burnham and Ron McGuigan have compiled the first comprehensive study of the Guards Division throughout the entire Waterloo campaign, from the initial deployment in Belgium to the Occupation of Paris. The book also includes an explanation of the organisation and composition of the two brigades and personal details of many of the Guards officers the men who saved the day at Waterloo.

"The Duke of Wellington was Britain's greatest soldier, whose victories turned the tide of Napoleon's conquests and played a crucial role in his downfall. Wellington went on to be a major figure in British politics, twice serving as Prime Minister. Often the centre of controversy, he was at times feted and celebrated as a national hero, at others reviled in the press and abused in the streets. He was a far more complicated man than the paragon of virtue celebrated by Victorian biographers. Rory Muir's masterly new biography, the first of a two volume set, is the result of thirty years research into the Duke of Wellington and his times. The author brings Wellington into much sharper focus than ever before, critically examining every aspect of his life from his unhappy childhood, his baptism into British and Irish politics and his remarkable successes in India, to the setbacks and triumphs of the Peninsular War. This is the first biography to address the significance of Wellington's political connections and the way they both helped and hindered his campaigns" -- jacket description.

The Battle of Waterloo has been studied and dissected so extensively that one might assume little more on the subject could be discovered. Now historian Peter Hofschröer brings forward a long-repressed commentary written by Carl von Clausewitz, the author of On War. Clausewitz, the Western world’s most renowned military theorist, participated in the Waterloo campaign as a senior staff officer in the Prussian army. His appraisal, offered here in an up-to-date and readable translation, criticized the Duke of Wellington’s actions. Lord Liverpool sent his translation of the manuscript to Wellington, who pronounced it a “lying work.” The translated commentary was quickly buried in Wellington’s private papers, where it languished for a century and a half. Now published for the first time in English, Hofschröer brings Clausewitz’s critique back into view with thorough annotation and contextual explanation. Peter Hofschröer, long recognized as a leading scholar of the Napoleonic Wars, shows how the Duke prevented the account’s publication during his lifetime—a manipulation of history so successful that almost two centuries passed before Clausewitz’s work reemerged, finally permitting a reappraisal of key events in the campaign. In addition to translating and annotating Clausewitz’s critique, Hofschröer also includes an order of battle and an extensive bibliography.

“An excellent account of the contribution of the newly formed (and short-lived) United Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Allied victory” (HistoryOfWar.org). The Dutch-Belgians have been variously described as inexperienced, incompetent, and cowardly, a rogue element in the otherwise disciplined Allied Army. It is only now being tentatively acknowledged that they alone saved Wellington from disaster at Quatre Bras. He had committed a strategic error in that, as Napoleon advanced, his own troops were scattered over a hundred kilometers of southern Belgium. Outnumbered three to one, the Netherlanders gave him time to concentrate his forces and save Brussels from French occupation. At Waterloo itself, on at least three occasions when the fate of the battle “hung upon the cusp,” their engagement with the enemy aided British recovery. Their commander—the Prince of Orange—has been viciously described as an arrogant fool, “a disaster waiting to happen,” and even a dangerous lunatic. According to the assessment of Wellington himself, he was a reliable and courageous subordinate. This book reveals a new dimension of the famous campaign and includes many unseen illustrations. For the first time, a full assessment is made of the challenge which Willem I faced as king of a country hastily cobbled together by the Congress of Vienna, and of his achievement in assembling, equipping, and training 30,000 men from scratch in eighteen months. “An extraordinary and impressively researched, written, organized and presented history that sheds considerable new light on one of the most influential battles of 19th century Europe.” —Midwest Book Review “A fascinating read.” —Military Heritage

One of the enduring controversies of the Waterloo campaign is the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. Given command of a third of Napoleons army and told to keep the Prussians from joining forces with Wellington, he failed to keep Wellington and Blcher apart with the result that Napoleon was overwhelmed at Waterloo. Grouchy, though, was not defeated. He kept his force together and retreated in good order back to France.Many have accused Grouchy of intentionally holding back his men and not marching to join Napoleon when the sound of the gunfire at Waterloo could clearly be heard, and he has been widely blamed for Napoleons defeat.Now, for the first time, Grouchys conduct during the Waterloo campaign is analyzed in fine detail, drawing principally on French sources not previously available in English. The author, for example, answers questions such as whether key orders did actually exist in 1815 or were they later fabrications to make Grouchy the scapegoat for Napoleons failures? Did General Grard really tell Grouchy to march to the sound of the guns? Why did Grouchy appear to move so slowly when speed was essential?This is a subject which is generally overlooked by British historians, who tend to concentrate on the actions of Wellington and Napoleon, and which French historians choose not to look at too closely for fear that it might reflect badly upon their hero Napoleon.Despite the mass of books written on Waterloo, this is a genuinely unique contribution to this most famous campaign. This book is certain to fuel debate and prompt historians to reconsider the events of June 1815.