This report examines how well DoD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs. The report includes: (1) an analysis of the overall performance of DoD's 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the portfolio performance at two other points in time -- 5 years ago and 1 year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 weapon programs -- primarily in development -- from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data on other factors that could impact program stability; and (4) an update on changes in DoD's acquisition policies. Includes a one- or two-page assessment of 67 weapon programs. Illustrations.

Examines DOD practices in procuring military weapons systems, other military hardware, and goods and services.

Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition—the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nation's defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion—less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.

This book focuses on the non-military military means through which states intervene to balance the economic and military power of other states. Also available as Open Access.