Looks at the challenges posed to the intelligence community by the changed strategic circumstances of the information age.

Dr. Bodnar builds on the earlier work and isight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise; Analysis for Strategic Warning was recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-seen original work of the USAF's strategic and operational philosopher Col. John Boyd. This book reaches farther than any other toward the objective of bringing together substantive expertise with an accessible, methodologically sound analytical strategy in the ervice of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

This book bequeaths to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the Intelligence Community at large, a substantiated vision, with examples, of how analysts can exploit already-available, massive databases to tackle many of the most vexing problems that we face. Dr. Bodnar builds on the earlier work and insight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning was recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-seen original work of the USAF's strategic and operational philosopher Colonel John Boyd.

This book bequeaths to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the Intelligence Community at large, a substantiated vision, with examples, of how analysts can exploit already-available, massive databases to tackle many of the most vexing problems that we face. Dr. Bodnar builds on the earlier work and insight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning [ADA476752] was recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-seen original work of the USAF's strategic and operational philosopher Colonel John Boyd. This book reaches farther than any other toward the objective of bringing together substantive expertise with an accessible, methodologically sound analytical strategy in the service of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Those who go on to apply this method will not only derive fresh understanding from existing data, but will also be able to guide future intelligence collection in an appropriately frugal fashion.

This book bequeaths to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the Intelligence Community at large, a substantiated vision, with examples, of how analysts can exploit already-available, massive databases to tackle many of the most vexing problems that we face. Dr. Bodnar builds on the earlier work and insight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning [ADA476752] was recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-seen original work of the USAF's strategic and operational philosopher Colonel John Boyd. This book reaches farther than any other toward the objective of bringing together substantive expertise with an accessible, methodologically sound analytical strategy in the service of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Those who go on to apply this method will not only derive fresh understanding from existing data, but will also be able to guide future intelligence collection in an appropriately frugal fashion.

This book examines intelligence analysis in the digital age and demonstrates how intelligence has entered a new era. While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. This volume uses the concept of the "digital age" to highlight the increased change, complexity, and pace of information that is now circulated, as new technology has reduced the time it takes to spread news to almost nothing. These factors mean that decision-makers face an increasingly challenging threat environment, which in turn increases the demand for timely, relevant, and reliable intelligence to support policymaking. In this context, the book demonstrates that intelligence places greater demands on analysis work, as the traditional intelligence cycle is no longer adequate as a process description. In the digital age, it is not enough to accumulate as much information as possible to gain a better understanding of the world. To meet customers’ needs, the intelligence process must be centred around the analysis work – which in turn has increased the demand for analysts. Assessments, not least predictions, are now just as important as revealing someone else’s secrets. This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, and international relations.