In the future, commanders at the operational level will face fighting an air operation with less resources. As the Gulf War reveals in many of its statistics, there are a number of ways this could happen. Current resource reductions might impact, as could weather, attrition, enemy actions and other things. Therefore, a commander must avoid policies that limit available resources. One such poor policy is the Omnibus agreement, which establishes a poor precedent for the management of resources in a resource-limited environment. This policy makes no sense either as a way to manage resources, or from the perspective of good warfighting doctrine. Remarkably, many of the principles in Marine Corps doctrine argue against the Omnibus Agreement. Obviously, there is an inherent conflict between the resource needs of operational and tactical level commanders which must be resolved to effectively manage resources and win wars. This conflict can only be effectively resolved with good operational planning. This planning eliminates confusion and prioritizes efforts. In future wars, such guidance is absolutely essential as resources become less. (KAR) P. 2.

This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent’s moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.

Recent assertions have been made that the nature of warfare in our current operating environment has changed in such a way that phasing in military operations has outlasted its utility and become problematic, requiring it to be eliminated or replaced in military planning. The problem this monograph attempts to evaluate and solve is whether or not phasing in U.S. Military doctrine and operational design still has utility in planning military operations, or if it should be eliminated or replaced by some other means of visualizing plans and arranging forces for military operations. Phasing has been utilized to assist U.S. Military commanders and planners to visualize plans and how forces should be arranged to conduct military operations and campaigns since the creation of operational design in the 1920's. Phasing has been applied in planning conventional as well as nonconventional military operations. Recent criticisms of phasing have surfaced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom's failure to rapidly stabilize Iraq in Phase IV of the operation. This paper analyzes phasing through theoretical and historical influences to trace how it has become a part of operational design and planning. Phasing is described and defined in U.S. Military doctrine from its first appearance as a method to assist in planning in the 1920's to the present and historical examples are provided as examples of its use. Mao Tse Tung's use of phasing to visualize the strategy for conducting his Protracted War against Japan is analyzed to determine what influence it may have had on U.S. Military doctrine. Criticism of phasing and proposed alternatives are presented and scrutinized through Systems Theory, Complexity Theory, logic, and doctrine to evaluate the rationality for criticism and applicability of alternative methods for visualizing plans and arranging forces. Recent changes and modifications to phasing in U.S. Military doctrine are analyzed to understand the logic behind the changes. Emerging concepts such as Operational Net Assessment, Effects Based Operations, and Net-Centric Warfare are described and analyzed through a "system of systems" approach to understand both the positive and negative influences they are having on U.S. Military doctrine and phasing. A concept for "red teaming" is proposed as a method for establishing a foundation for understanding strategic and operational problems, synchronizing efforts, and coordinating between the U.S. Military, other government agencies, and non-government agencies to improve problem solving capabilities and integration of elements of national power. The influence emerging concepts are having on doctrine and their military applications are analyzed to determine how they can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of arranging forces through phasing in operational design. The principle findings and conclusions are that warfare in our current operating environment has not changed in such a way that has made it necessary to eliminate or replace phasing in military planning. Phasing is not a method for solving problems. Military operations or campaigns to solve problems should be visualized from start to finish in order create an understanding of what must be accomplished to achieve the desired end-state. Phasing should be utilized within the visualization of the plan to arrange forces in terms of resources, time, space and purpose to accomplish objectives that cannot be accomplished concurrently or require transition of efforts or forces within the plan. The phases of a plan should be analyzed holistically in order to understand the relationships between the phases and how actions in each phase will effect the others. Misuse, misunderstanding, and misapplication of phasing in military planning can lead to plans that fail to achieve strategic and operational end-states.

This publication describes the theory and philosophy of military planning as practiced by the U.S. Marine Corps. The intent is to describe how we can prepare effectively for future action when the future is uncertain and unpredictable. In so doing, this publication provides all Marines a conceptual framework for planning in peace, in crisis, or in war. This approach to planning is based on our common understanding of the nature of war and on our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting.

This study aims to show that current thinking about the role of resources in war, and as a component of military potential in peacetime, relies on notions derived from historical experience and changes in the nature of warfare, not least the advent of nuclear weapons.