Weeks have passed since Ariana and Alec escaped from Kellen's dungeon, but danger isn't far behind them. Back in Anscombe, Zelene has grown tired of waiting for the Duillaine to help her twin. But Zelene’s plans go awry when she finds herself with a new ability, a mysterious new friend, and more enemies within the walls of Anscombe than she thought.

The story of British beer and brewing during WW I and WW II. With a side order of Germany, France and the Netherlands. Numbers, social history, crappy jokes and lots of homebrew recipes.

This book studies the evolution of the war prerogative in England from 1600-2012. It traces the historical theory and practice of the war prerogative and proposes reform of the constitutional arrangements for its exercise. It addresses three key questions. First, what have writers on political and constitutional theory said about the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, and, in particular, what justifications have been advanced for those arrangements? Secondly, in practice, has the executive in fact possessed sole and exclusive powers over war and the deployment of force, or have Parliament and the courts had a role to play in their exercise and scrutiny? Thirdly, are there better ways to organise our constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, to enable a more substantive role for Parliament (particularly the House of Commons) in its exercise and scrutiny? On the first question, it is shown that orthodox theoretical and political discourses have continuously asserted the executive's exclusive power over war, but the justifications advanced for that arrangement have changed over time. Those changes reflect the varying influence of different political theories at different times. On the second question, it is found that, contrary to orthodox theoretical and political discourses, Parliament has played an active and substantive role in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. The courts have refused to intervene in the exercise of the war prerogative, but have been more ready to intervene in cases involving the exercise of powers incidental to the war prerogative. On the third question, it is argued that reform of the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative is necessary and desirable. The use of 'institutional mechanisms' is recommended, which are small-scale rules and institutional arrangements, within existing institutions, which aim to promote certain normative goals. In particular, the enactment of a statute is proposed, which would impose conditions on the executive's exercise of its war prerogative. It is argued that these proposals show that, through careful institutional design, democratic values, national security, and operational efficiency can each be reconciled and promoted.

Reprint of the original, first published in 1856.

For the last two decades, Sidney Tarrow has explored "contentious politics"—disruptions of the settled political order caused by social movements. These disruptions range from strikes and street protests to riots and civil disobedience to revolution. In War, States, and Contention, Tarrow shows how such movements sometimes trigger, animate, and guide the course of war and how they sometimes rise during war and in war's wake to change regimes or even overthrow states. Tarrow draws on evidence from historical and contemporary cases, including revolutionary France, the United States from the Civil War to the anti–Vietnam War movement, Italy after World War I, and the United States during the decade following 9/11.In the twenty-first century, movements are becoming transnational, and globalization and internationalization are moving war beyond conflict between states. The radically new phenomenon is not that movements make war against states but that states make war against movements. Tarrow finds this an especially troublesome development in recent U.S. history. He argues that that the United States is in danger of abandoning the devotion to rights it had expanded through two centuries of struggle and that Americans are now institutionalizing as a "new normal" the abuse of rights in the name of national security. He expands this hypothesis to the global level through what he calls "the international state of emergency."