2005 Scholar's Bookshelf Reprint. An invaluable, highly detailed history of the closing campaign of the American Revolution, with extensive material on the French-American alliance and the roles played both in the diplomatic background and the military history of the campaign by Louis XVI, Franklin, Vergennes, DEstaing, Rochambeau, and Lafayette. The work includes special chapters on Clinton and Cornwallis, the sea battle off the capes of Virginia, and the siege and surrender of the British. Originally published in 1931 by the U.S. Government Printing Office to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the events. 2005:219 pages, illustrated. Softcover.

This greatly expanded second edition of the Historical Dictionary of the American Revolution covers more battles, skirmishes, and raids of the American Revolution than any other printed source. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, maps and photos, a bibliography, and over 1000 cross-referenced dictionary entries.

In early 1781, after his victories in the Southern Colonies, Lord Cornwallis marched his army north into Virginia. He believed the Americans could be decisively defeated in Virginia and the war brought to an end. George Washington believed Cornwallis's move was a strategic blunder, and he moved vigorously to exploit it. Feinting against General Clinton and the British stronghold of New York, Washington marched his army quickly south. With the assistance of Rochambeau's infantry and a key French naval victory at the Battle off the Capes in September, Washington trapped Cornwallis on the tip of a narrow Virginia peninsula at a place called Yorktown. And so it began. Operating on the belief that Clinton would arrive with reinforcements, Cornwallis confidently remained within Yorktown's inadequate defenses. Determined that nothing short of outright surrender would suffice, his opponent labored day and night to achieve that end. Washington's brilliance was on display as he skillfully constricted Cornwallis's position by digging entrenchments, erecting redoubts and artillery batteries, and launching well-timed attacks to capture key enemy positions. The nearly flawless Allied campaign sealed Cornwallis's fate. Trapped inside crumbling defenses, he surrendered on October 19, 1781, effectively ending the war in North America.

In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778–81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War—and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis’s operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists’ support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter’s analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.

The War of American Independence, 1763–1783: Falling Dominoes addresses the military, maritime and naval, economic, key personalities, key societal groups, political, imperial rivalry, and diplomatic dynamics and events from the post-Seven Years’ War era in Great Britain’s North American colonies through the end of the War of American Independence. Beginning in 1763 and moving through the war chronologically, the authors argue that British political and strategic leaders failed to develop an effective strategy to quell the discontent and subsequent revolt in the North American colonies and thus failed to restore allegiance to the Crown. This book describes and analyzes events and the outcomes of central players’ decisions—the British North American colonies, Great Britain, France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic—and the resultant actions. It examines events through the thematic lens of strategy, political and military leadership, public attitudes, economics, international rivalries and relations, and the role of traditionally less-considered groups: women, slaves, and Native American peoples. This book is an enlightening and essential read for all history students, from high school through to those on postgraduate courses, as well as those with an interest in the American Revolution.