After a precipitate reunification (1975), the Hanoi leadership imposed upon the South the Stalinist-Maoist strategy of economic development which had been until then applied in the North. This "Northernization" resulted in an economic crisis for the whole country during the last years of the Second Five-Year Plan. Despite some partial reforms, the country was again plunged into a more serious economic and financial crisis at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan, particularly after the ill-conceived monetary reform in September 1985. At the time of its Sixth National Congress (December 1986) the Party's new leadership advocated a strategic shift in its overall economic policy under the banner of Doi Moi (Renovation).

This anthology concentrates on domestic questions, economic policies, and socialist development and ideology. The essays' subjects include such varied topics as education, economics, the military, leadership, and economic assistance and humanitarian aid.

This clear and accessible text explores Vietnam's successful transition from neo-Stalinist central planning to a market economy—\"Vietnamese style.\" After describing the north Vietnamese system prior to 1975 and its colonial and precolonial antecedents, the authors uncover the mechanisms of that changeover. They contend that the Vietnamese transition was largely bottom-up in character and that it evolved over a long enough period for the country's political economy to adjust. This explains in part the rapid shift to a high-growth, externally oriented development path in the early 1990s, despite the loss of Soviet aid and the lack of significant Western substitutes until 1992-1993. Based upon extensive incountry experience, a wealth of primary materials, and wide comparative knowledge of development issues, the book challenges many preconceived notions, both about Vietnam and about the general nature of transition processes.

Through the voices of senior officials, teachers, soldiers, journalists, and artists, The Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1975, presents us with an interpretation of "South Vietnam" as a passionately imagined nation in the minds of ordinary Vietnamese, rather than merely as an expeditious political construct of the United States government. The moving and honest memoirs collected, translated, and edited here by Tuong Vu and Sean Fear describe the experiences of war, politics, and everyday life for people from many walks of life during the fraught years of Vietnam's Second Republic, leading up to and encompassing what Americans generally call the "Vietnam War." The voices gift the reader a sense of the authors' experiences in the Republic and their ideas about the nation during that time. The light and careful editing hand of Vu and Fear reveals that far from a Cold War proxy struggle, the conflict in Vietnam featured a true ideological divide between the communist North and the non-communist South.

This book, first published in 1999, compares the strategies of France and Japan in trying to win economic and political influence in the newly emerging Vietnam, which opened to the international community only after the Vietnamese Communist Party had started economic reforms in 1986. These reforms are aimed at transforming the country’s centrally-planned economy into a government-controlled market economy and at opening Vietnam to foreign capital, technology and know-how. This setting provides a unique opportunity for comparing the strategies of two nations from different continents in conducting their economic relations with a unified Vietnam.

This book traces the economic history of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975, the period encompassing the Vietnam war.

This book investigates why collectivised farming failed in south Vietnam after 1975. Despite the strong will of the new regime to implement collectivisation, the effort was uneven, misapplied and subverted. After only 10 years of trying, the regime annulled the policy. Focusing on two case studies—Quảng Nam province in the Central Coast region and An Giang province in the Mekong Delta—and based on extensive evidence, this study argues that the reasons for variations in implementation and the failure and reversal of the policy were twofold: regional differences and local politics.