This book reveals the evolving US, Viet Cong and NVA tactics at battalion level and below throughout the Vietnam War. Beginning with a description of the terrain, climate and the unique nature of operations in this theatre of war, the author, a Vietnam veteran himself, goes on to explain how unit organisation was broken down by combatant forces and the impact this had on the kind of tactics they employed. In particular, the author highlights how units were organised in reality on the battlefield as opposed to their theoretical tables of organisation. US tactics included the standard US tactical doctrine as prescribed by several field manuals and in which leaders and troops were rigourously trained. But it also reveals how many American units developed innovative small unit tactics specifically tailored to the terrain and enemy practices. In contrast, this book also reveals the tactics employed by Viet Cong and NVA units including their own Offensive Operations, Reconnaissance, Movement Formations and Security, and Ambushes.

In this book the author – an Army veteran of Vietnam – explains the composition, capabilities, equipment and missions of the US Army and Marine Corps helicopter and airmobile units in the Vietnam war and exactly how they carried out their missions. It centers on the classic airmobile assault mission: how it was planned and prepared; how the troop-carrying “slicks” and their “gunship” escorts and support teams actually operated; and the opposition and hazards that they faced on the LZ. The text is illustrated with wartime photos, organization charts, and color plates showing both the machines and the tactics that where employed.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.

From the German stormtroopers of 1918 to the jungles of Vietnam, the role of the infantry soldier has developed and evolved. This book describes the changes in the way that infantrymen have fought through the century, including an anlysis of tactics and strategies in the light of new technology.

In 1965, despite pronounced disadvantages in firepower and mobility, the Communist Vietnamese endeavored to crush South Vietnam and expel the American military with a strategy for a quick and decisive victory predicated not on guerrilla but big-unit war. Warren Wilkins chronicles the formation, development, and participation of the Viet Cong in the opening phase of the big-unit war and shows how the failure of that strategy profoundly influenced the decision to launch the Tet Offensive. Unlike most books on the war, this one provides an authentic account from the Communist perspective, wi ...

"Admiral Sharp draws a grim and frightening picture of what happened -- and could happen again." -- Union-Leader (Manchester, NH)