One of our most distinguished Army commanders identifies the failed policies that have compromised the U. S. military's ability to protect the nation's interests.

Voter turnout was unusually high in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. At first glance, that level of participation—largely spurred by war in Iraq and a burgeoning culture war at home—might look like vindication of democracy. If the recent past is any indication, however, too many Americans will soon return to apathy and inactivity. Clearly, all is not well in our civic life. Citizens are participating in public affairs too infrequently, too unequally, and in too few venues to develop and sustain a robust democracy. This important new book explores the problem of America's decreasing involvement in its own affairs. D emocracy at Risk reveals the dangers of civic disengagement for the future of representative democracy. The authors, all eminent scholars, undertake three main tasks: documenting recent trends in civic engagement, exploring the influence that the design of political institutions and public policies have had on those trends, and recommending steps that will increase the amount and quality of civic engagement in America. The authors focus their attention on three key areas: the electoral process, including elections and the way people get involved; the impact of location, including demographic shifts and changing development patterns; and the critical role of nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations, including the philanthropy that help keep them going. This important project, initially sponsored by the American Political Science Association, tests the proposition that social science has useful insights on the state of our democratic life. Most importantly, it charts a course for reinvigorating civic participation in the world's oldest democracy. The authors: Stephen Macedo (Princeton University), Yvette Alex-Assensoh (Indiana University), Jeffrey M. Berry (Tufts), Michael Brintnall (American Political Science Association), David E. Campbell (Notre Dame), Luis Ricardo Fraga (Stanford), Archon Fung (Harvard), William

Discusses the way leaders deal with risk in making foreign policy decisions

While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a "culminating point" where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the "red theory of victory." Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their "escalation calculus"-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies.

From the bestselling author of Team of Teams and My Share of the Task, an entirely new way to understand risk and master the unknown. Retired four-star general Stan McChrystal has lived a life associated with the deadly risks of combat. From his first day at West Point, to his years in Afghanistan, to his efforts helping business leaders navigate a global pandemic, McChrystal has seen how individuals and organizations fail to mitigate risk. Why? Because they focus on the probability of something happening instead of the interface by which it can be managed. In this new book, General McChrystal offers a battle-tested system for detecting and responding to risk. Instead of defining risk as a force to predict, McChrystal and coauthor Anna Butrico show that there are in fact ten dimensions of control we can adjust at any given time. By closely monitoring these controls, we can maintain a healthy Risk Immune System that allows us to effectively anticipate, identify, analyze, and act upon the ever-present possibility that things will not go as planned. Drawing on examples ranging from military history to the business world, and offering practical exercises to improve preparedness, McChrystal illustrates how these ten factors are always in effect, and how by considering them, individuals and organizations can exert mastery over every conceivable sort of risk that they might face. We may not be able to see the future, but with McChrystal’s hard-won guidance, we can improve our resistance and build a strong defense against what we know—and what we don't.

America repeatedly finds itself mired in military interventions long after public buy-in to the national interest has waned. Why is the timely disengagement of military forces so difficult to achieve? Traditional international relations theories diminish the role of the individual leader in favor of the state or international institutions. Behavioral science theories have in recent years experienced a resurgence. However, the dominant behavioral explanation of foreign policy decision-making, prospect theory, while it focuses on how people tend to make decisions under risk, still minimizes the influence of the individual president. Decisions to disengage military forces are presidential decisions, just like the decisions to commit forces to foreign interventions. If we accept this, then it is important to understand if, and if so why, some presidents inherently are more or less acceptant of the risks disengagement presents. This book operationalizes a competing personality-based model of decision-making under risk. Referred to here as the trait-based model, it is assessed using disengagement opportunities in three varied levels of military intervention across four presidencies: humanitarian relief turned nation-building under George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in Somalia, compellent air campaigns turned peace-making/keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo under Clinton, and major combat operations turned irregular warfare in Iraq under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Data for the model predominantly comes from existing presidential personality profiles based on the dominant model of personality theory, the five-factor model, augmented by Myers-Briggs Type Inventory data from public sources. This study aims to explain the roughly 30 percent of cases which defy prospect theory's predictions and to better explain those cases where prospect theory might heretofore have sufficed. The results suggest specific personality traits do in fact point to presidents' predispositions toward risk, which in turn help explain their disengagement decisions. This work may be only the second to apply the five-factor model to presidential foreign policy decision-making and is the first to do so in the context of disengagement decisions. Hopefully it will foster further work in both areas.