The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.

In her pioneering book Platform Leadership (with Michael Cusumano), Gawer gave us the strategy of building coalitions of customers, suppliers, and complementors. Now, she brings together a number of the leading researchers in the area of platform strategy to give us a book that will be a key reference for both practitioners and academics. Adam Brandenburger, New York University, US Annabelle Gawer s collected volume of research shows that a vibrant community of scholars has arisen around platforms and innovation. Each of the chapters is first rate, with top researchers offering some of their latest work. This will be an indispensable book for students of innovation and technology management everywhere. Henry Chesbrough, University of California, Berkeley, US Annabelle Gawer s Platforms, Markets and Innovation is the first serious exploration of the critical but subtle role that platforms play in business, society and our personal lives. As digital technologies penetrate every nook and cranny of the world around us, we rely on platforms to both help us use the new technologies, as well as to organize new markets of innovation that add applications on top of the platforms and make them far more valuable. Dr Gawer s excellent book is designed to help us understand the mysterious nature of platforms. It brings together the insights of twenty-four experts around the world who contributed to the fourteen chapters of the book. Dr Gawer s book is invaluable to anyone trying to understand the nuanced nature of platforms, and their implications for the evolution of innovation in the 21st century. Irving Wladawsky-Berger, IBM Academy of Technology, US The emergence of platforms is a novel phenomenon impacting most industries, from products to services. Industry platforms such as Microsoft Windows or Google, embedded within industrial ecosystems, have redesigned our industrial landscapes, upset the balance of power between firms, fostered innovation and raised new questions on competition and innovation. Annabelle Gawer presents cutting-edge contributions from 24 top international scholars from 19 universities across Europe, the USA and Asia, from the disciplines of strategy, economics, innovation, organization studies and knowledge management. The novel insights assembled in this volume constitute a fundamental step towards an empirically based, nuanced understanding of the nature of platforms and the implications they hold for the evolution of industrial innovation. The book provides an overview of platforms and discusses governance, management, design and knowledge issues. With a multidisciplinary approach, this book will strongly appeal to academics and advanced students in management, innovation, strategy, economics and design. It will also prove an enlightening read for business managers in IT industries.

Competition policy debates on digital platform markets are often premised on the idea that market fragmentation and the standard forces of competition and entry may provide a potential solution to excessive concentration and market power. In this work, Francesco Ducci provides readers with a different perspective based on the theoretical lens of natural monopoly. Ducci explores this framework through the development of three case studies on horizontal search, e-commerce marketplaces, and ride-hailing platforms, investigating the strength and limit of potential (and often heterogeneous) sources of natural monopoly at play in each industry. Building on these case studies, the book then derives from the application of the natural monopoly framework general policy implications for digital industries by identifying the respective institutional flaws and shortcomings of ex ante and ex post approaches to market power as one of the central challenges in digital platform markets.

With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.

A comprehensive analysis of merger outcomes based on all empirical studies, with an assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy toward mergers. In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy. In this book, John Kwoka, a noted authority on industrial organization, examines all reliable empirical studies of the effect of specific mergers and develops entirely new information about the policies and remedies of antitrust agencies regarding these mergers. Combined with data on outcomes, this policy information enables analysis of, and creates new insights into, mergers, merger policies, and the effectiveness of remedies in preventing anticompetitive outcomes. After an overview of mergers, merger policy, and a common approach to merger analysis, Kwoka offers a detailed analysis of the studied mergers, relevant policies, and chosen remedies. Kwoka finds, first and foremost, that most of the studied mergers resulted in competitive harm, usually in the form of higher product prices but also with respect to various non-price outcomes. Other important findings include the fact that joint ventures and code sharing arrangements do not result in such harm and that policies intended to remedy mergers—especially conduct remedies—are not generally effective in restraining price increases. The book's uniquely comprehensive analysis advances our understanding of merger decisions and policies, suggests policy improvements for competition agencies and remedies, and points the way to future research.

Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.