The first book to draw a blueprint for defeating al-Qaeda on ideological rather than military grounds.

This book examines the communicative aspects and implications of US counter-terrorist policies towards al-Qaeda. Recent US counter-terrorist strategy has been largely based upon projecting certain perceptions of America as an actor to those drawn to al-Qaeda, and this book investigates in what ways, and to what extent, US officials believed that the signals sent by what America did and said could influence the behaviour of the terrorist and would-be terrorist. The study then draws on a growing understanding of that audience to analyse how those drawn to al-Qaeda were and, indeed, still are likely to be influenced by the perceptions of America that Washington's policies generated. The study's central argument is that, given al-Qaeda's unconventional strategy and the particularities of the world-view characterising those drawn to the group, America's counter-terrorist signalling proved largely counter-productive to America's objective of undermining al-Qaeda's strategic narrative, instead serving in many ways to validate it. Firstly, this book seeks to reveal the significant and largely unexplored role that signalling has played in US counter-terrorist policy towards al-Qaeda. Second, it tries to capture the objectives, strategy, tactics, ideology, and other defining features of the world-view characterising those drawn to al-Qaeda. Third, it strives to combine those two lines of inquiry by applying the al-Qaeda world-view to a critical analysis of the signals sent by US policies. Finally, the book aims to offer broad policy implications that demonstrate how an informed understanding of the world-view of those drawn to al-Qaeda can be employed to revise and refine American counter-terrorist signalling. This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy and public diplomacy, counter-terrorism, strategy and international security. Joshua Alexander Geltzer has a PhD in War Studies from Kings College London, and is currently a juris doctoral student at Yale Law School.

It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.

The 9/11 attacks fundamentally transformed how the US approached terrorism, and led to the unprecedented expansion of counterterrorism strategies, policies, and practices. While the analysis of these developments is rich and vast, there remains a significant void. The diverse actors contributing to counterterrorism increasingly consider, engage and impact women as agents, partners, and targets of their work. Yet, flawed assumptions and stereotypes remain prevalent, and it remains undocumented and unclear how and why counterterrorism efforts have evolved as they did, including in relation to women. Drawing on extensive primary source documents, A Woman's Place traces the evolution of women in US counterterrorism efforts through the administrations of Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, examining key agencies like the US Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID. In their own words, Joana Cook investigates how and why women have developed the roles they have, and interrogates US counterterrorism practices in key countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Analysing conceptions of and responses to terrorists, she also considers how the roles of women in Al- Qaeda and Daesh have evolved and impacted on US counterterrorism considerations.

Why is the problem of terrorism-and the emergence of more extreme and more brutal terrorist groups-one that cannot be solved, even after decades of trying? The world has up to now failed to stop Al Qaeda terrorist attacks and also failed to stop the emergence of more extreme and more brutal terrorist groups than Al Qaeda, such as ISIS/ISIL, as well as newer lone wolf terrorists. Current strategies of counterterrorism have many shortcomings that allow terrorists to continue their operations. A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL, and How to Defeat Terrorists identifies the shortcomings of present approaches and presents a comprehensive and sustainable strategy to combat terrorism. Author Ambassador T. Hamid Al-Bayati, an Iraqi politician, offers a unique insider's perspective about the war on terrorism. As a leader of the opposition against the terrorist regime of Saddam Hussein, he was arrested and tortured, until he fled Iraq. From the UK, he continued involvement in unfolding political events, until returning to Iraq and assuming high political appointments. These special insights are interwoven with accounts of detailed interactions and policies that provide the background for his explanation of the failures of counterterrorism strategies to date, and lessons learned from those mistakes. Al-Bayati spotlights the problems of terrorist cells, lone wolves, and foreign fighters developing in all parts of the world, where members work from safe havens to plan attacks, acquire weapons, and gain fighting experience. His proposed strategy further emphasizes issues neglected in current counterterrorism strategies, such as undermining the ideology of terrorists, interrupting their use of the Internet to promote evil, understanding the motivations and psychology of terrorists, deterring youth from joining ISIS, creating effective media campaigns against terrorism, and shutting off the flow of funding that currently buoys the financial resources of terrorist organizations.

This monograph reviews events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and discusses the current state of al Qaeda and the kinds of actions that can be expected of it in the future. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States, so the campaign against terrorism must remain focused. The monograph describes the central elements that must be emphasized in the next, more-complex phase of that campaign.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century analyzes the most significant dimensions of combating terrorism, including considerations of strategic and tactical issues (hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence); the need to thwart sources and facilitators (weak governments, ill-conceived foreign policy, and trafficking in drugs, guns, and humans); and the incorporation of lessons learned thus far from combating terrorism around the globe. Since the dawn of the new millennium, combating terrorism has become a primary focus of security professionals throughout the world. The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States, while many countries—from Algeria and Spain to Sri Lanka and Indonesia—have redoubled their efforts to combat their own indigenous terrorism threats. In the Unites States, the counterterrorism goals identified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) can only be achieved through significant multinational cooperation. These goals are to advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideologies of terrorism; to prevent attacks by terrorist networks; to deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; to deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and to lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism efforts, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do this better? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated. Volume 1: Strategic and Tactical Considerations examines issues of hard power, soft power, and intelligence/counterintelligence. Volume 2: Sources and Facilitators covers state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, networks and trade and trafficking, and societal issues. Volume 3: Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency includes case studies of counterterrorism operations (e.g., the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the capture of key terrorist suspects like Ramzi Youssef and Khalid Sheikh Mohamad); and case studies of long-term efforts to combat terrorism (e.g., the Basques in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Israel's struggle against Palestinian terror organizations, Peru and Sendero Luminoso, and Japan and Aum Shinrikyo).