This volume deals with strategic planning in the midwar era from January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of the hopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army strategic planners coming to grips with the problems of the offensive phase of coalition warfare. Basic to this story is the account of planning by General George C. Marshall and his advisers in the great debate on European strategy which followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to the penetration of the German frontier in September 1944. During this period the great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to the second Quebec in September 1944 were held and the Allies formulated the grand strategy of military victory. The volume follows the plans, issues, and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944, when the problems of winning the war began to come up against the challenges of victory and peace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and his advisers. Military soldiers, veterans, especially World War II veterans adn their families, and students studying World War II may enjoy reading this primary source document that accounts the leadership and strategy during World War Two years 1943-1944. Related products: United States Army in World War 2, War Department, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00056-3 Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army's Senior Officer is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00538-7 Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army: Portraits & Biographical Sketches 2010 is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00537-9 World War II resources collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/world...

CMH 70-42. Army Special Publication. Discusses a variety of commando and guerrilla operations that were conducted on the plains of Europe and in the jungles of the Pacific to harass the Axis armies, to gather intelligence, and to support the more conventional Allied military efforts, yet their significance was a matter of dispute. Hogan examines the critical issues underlying special operations and shows how American leaders employed commandos - rangers in Army parlance - and guerrillas extensively, if not systematically, during the war. Other related products: World War II resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/world-war-ii Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service During World War II --Print Paperback format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00432-1 American Military History Volume 2: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008 --Print Hardcover format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00525-5 Special Operations Forces Medical Handbook -- Looseleaf with binder format-- can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00810-6 --CD-ROM format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00816-5 --ePub format available from Apple iBookstore and Google Play eBookstore. Please use ISBN: 9780160867194 to search this title through their platform(s).

CMH Pub. 10-14. United States Army in World War 2. Tells the story of Quartermaster supply and service in the war against Japan in the Pacific. Concentrates on the many problems which were inevitable in a distant and strange environment. Reflects the viewpoint of the troops and the commanders in the field.

A selection of the Military Book Club: “A solid operational analysis” from “an established scholar of the Scandinavian theater” (Publishers Weekly). This book describes the odd coalition between Germany and Finland in World War II and their joint military operations from 1941 to 1945. In stark contrast to the numerous books on the shorter and less bloody Winter War, which represented a gallant fight of a democratic “David” against a totalitarian “Goliath” and caught the imagination of the world, the story of Finland fighting alongside a Goliath of its own has not brought pride to that nation and was a period many Finns would rather forget. A prologue brings the reader up to speed by briefly examining the difficult history of Finland, from its separation from the Soviet Union in 1917 to its isolation after being bludgeoned in 1939–40. It then examines both Finnish and German motives for forming a coalition against the USSR, and how—as logical as a common enemy would seem—the lack of true planning and preparation would doom the alliance. In this book, Henrik Lunde, a former US Special Operations colonel and author of Hitler’s Pre-emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, once again fills a profound gap in our understanding of World War II.

Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.

Awarded NASOH's 2012 "John Lyman Book Award for Best U.S. Naval History," Allied Master Strategists describes the unique and vital contribution to Allied victory in World War II made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Based on a combination of primary and secondary source material, this book proves that the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was the glue holding the British-American wartime alliance together. As such, the Combined Chiefs of Staff was probably the most important international organization of the Twentieth Century. Readers will get a good view of the personalities of the principals, such as Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. The book provides insight into the relationships between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Allied theater commanders, the role of the Combined Chiefs regarding economic mobilization, and the bitter inter-Allied strategic debates in regard to OVERLORD and the war in the Pacific. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the British American alliance in World War II. Careful attention is paid in the book to the three organizations that contributed the principal membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; i.e., the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and (in the case of Sir John Dill) the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. After providing a biographical background of the principal member so the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Rigby provides information on wartime Washington, D.C. as the home base for the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization. Detailed information is given regarding the Casablanca Conference, but the author is careful to distinguish between the formal nature of the big Allied wartime summit meetings and the much less formal day-to-day give and take which characterized British-American strategic debates between the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, it is a major contention of the book that it is critical to remember that more than half of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff took place in Washington, D.C. in a regularly scheduled weekly pattern and not at the big Allied conferences such as Yalta. The role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in directing the war in the Pacific and in planning the OVERLORD cross-channel invasion of western Europe, respectively, is covered in detail. These were the two most contentious issues with which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to deal. Rigby attempts to answer the question of why two combative, fearless, warriors like Churchill and Brooke would be so unwilling to go back across the Channel, and to explain the tug-of-war the British Chiefs of Staff had to conduct with Churchill before a British battle fleet could join the American Central Pacific Drive late in the war. The book also provides a wealth of information on the role played by members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the spheres of economic mobilization and wartime diplomacy. Most of all, what Allied Master Strategists does is to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff what they have long deserved—a book of their own; a book that is not weighted towards the U.S. Joint Chiefs on the one hand or the British Chiefs of Staff on the other; a book that is not strictly a “naval” book, an “army” book, or an “air” book, but a book that like the western alliance during World War II, is truly “combined” in an international as well as an interservice manner.

During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.