ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.

The tank revolutionized the battlefield in World War II. In the years since, additional technological developments—including nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, computer assisted firing, and satellite navigation—have continued to transform the face of combat. The only complete history of U.S. armed forces from the advent of the tank in battle during World War I to the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, Camp Colt to Desert Storm traces the development of doctrine for operations at the tactical and operational levels of war and translates this fighting doctrine into the development of equipment.

The Army and joint force must adapt and prepare for large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethality to exploit. The reduction of friendly, forward-stationedforces, significant reductions in capability and capacity across the entire joint force, and the pace of modernizationmake it imperative that we do everything possible to prepare for worst-case scenarios. We must be ready to winwith the forces we have, and having the right doctrine is a critical part

This book describes how future Army forces, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests. It describes the Army's contribution to globally integrated operations, and addresses the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities for the Joint Force and to project power onto land and from land across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept guides future force development through the identification of first order capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and objectives.

This US Army field manual, Field Manual FM 3-0 Operations October 2017, is applicable to all members of the Army Profession: leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians. The principle audience for FM 3-0 is commanders, staffs, and leaders of theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades. This manual also provides the foundation for training and Army education system curricula and future capabilities development across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (known as DOTMLPF). FM 3-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. Today's operational environment presents threats to the Army and joint force that are significantly more dangerous in terms of capability and magnitude than those we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are actively seeking to gain strategic positional advantage. These nations, and other adversaries, are fielding capabilities to deny long-held U.S. freedom of action in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and reduce U.S. influence in critical areas of the world. In some contexts they already have overmatch or parity, a challenge the joint force has not faced in twenty-five years. The proliferation of advanced technologies; adversary emphasis on force training, modernization, and professionalization; the rise of revisionist, revanchist, and extremist ideologies; and the ever increasing speed of human interaction makes large-scale ground combat more lethal, and more likely, than it has been in a generation. As the Army and the joint force focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other capabilities, our adversaries watched, learned, adapted, modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be required to fight. The Army and joint force must adapt and prepare for large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethal environments where enemies employ potent long range fires and other capabilities that rival or surpass our own. The risk of inaction is great; the less prepared we are to meet these challenges, the greater the likelihood for conflict with those who seek windows of opportunity to exploit. The reduction of friendly, forward-stationed forces, significant reductions in capability and capacity across the entire joint force, and the pace of modernization make it imperative that we do everything possible to prepare for worst-case scenarios. We must be ready to win with the forces we have, and having the right doctrine is a critical part of that readiness. FM 3-0 provides a doctrinal approach for our theater armies, corps, divisions and brigades to address the challenges of shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, prevailing during large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains to follow through on tactical success. FM 3-0 is about how we deter adversaries and fight a peer threat today, with today's forces and today's capabilities. It addresses operations to counter threats in three broad contexts that account for what the Nation asks its Army to do. Two chapters describe operations to defeat aggression by subversion of U.S. partners and interests, which is fundamental to winning short of war. Three chapters describe operations to defeat enemies during large-scale ground combat operations, which is fundamental to winning wars. The final chapter describes operations to complete the tasks necessary to ensure enduring outcomes, which is fundamental to achieving the ultimate strategic purpose of employing Army forces.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?