Since 2010, Unwinnable has been a showcase for offbeat, experimental, poignant and funny stories about games, books, movies and even weird stuff, like an advice column from a space marine 38,000 years in the future. We're devoted to examining the intersection of the culture we love and the lives we lead, bringing you the best in pop-cultural criticism, creative non-fiction and the occasional serialized short once a week in a beautiful digital magazine. Unwinnable is life with culture. In this issue, Ian Gonzales talks to Jörg Tittel, writer of the forthcoming graphic novel Ricky Rouse has a Gun about satire and cheap knock-offs. Juan Valdelomar responds to Matt Duhamel’s “An Artist’s Statement” (from way back in Issue Eight) with a statement of his own. Cassidee Moser has a personal revelation thanks to the Nintendo 3DS Street Pass. Finally, Ansh Patel ruminates on how death is not the end in Crusader Kings II. No matter what your taste, Unwinnable Weekly has you covered, so make sure to check out our selection of back issues today!

Sibylla has always craved adventure, but she never guessed it would finally arrive in the form of a giant, magical bull. Is he a man, or a monster? And who knew a prophecy could be so literal? With this first book in a new series co-created by sibling writer/artist team CAT SEATON and KIT SEATON, the adventure of a lifetime begins.

Acclaimed novelist/Eisner-winning graphic novelist Joe Hill collaborated with his father, Stephen King, for the first time on a tale that paid tribute to Richard Matheson's classic tale, Duel. Now, IDW is proud to present comic-book tellings of both stories in Road Rage. First up, is the Hill/King adventure tale, Throttle! Adapted by Chris Ryall alongside Hill & King and featuring art by Nelson Daniel (Joe Hill's The Cape), Throttle tells the tale of a motorcycle gang pursued by an unseen assailant in a big rig!

Afghanistan was an unwinnable war. As British and American troops withdraw, discover this definitive account that explains why. It could have been a very different story. British forces could have successfully withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2002, having done the job they set out to do: to defeat al-Qaeda. Instead, in the years that followed, Britain paid a devastating price for their presence in Helmand province. So why did Britain enter, and remain, in an ill-fated war? Why did it fail so dramatically, and was this expedition doomed from the beginning? Drawing on unprecedented access to military reports, government documents and senior individuals, Professor Theo Farrell provides an extraordinary work of scholarship. He explains the origins of the war, details the campaigns over the subsequent years, and examines the West's failure to understand the dynamics of local conflict and learn the lessons of history that ultimately led to devastating costs and repercussions still relevant today. 'The best book so far on Britain's...war in Afghanistan' International Affairs 'Masterful, irrefutable... Farrell records all these military encounters with the irresistible pace of a novelist' Sunday Times

Eight years after 9/11 and in the shadow of two protracted U.S. military campaigns in the Middle East, the enemy is not only undefeated but emboldened and resurgent. What went wrong_and what should we do going forward? Winning the Unwinnable War shows how our own policy ideas led to 9/11 and then crippled our response in the Middle East, and it makes the case for an unsettling conclusion: By subordinating military victory to perverse, allegedly moral constraints, Washington's policy has undermined our national security. Owing to the significant influence of Just War Theory and neoconservatism, the Bush administration consciously put the imperative of shielding civilians and bringing them elections above the goal of eliminating real threats to our security. Consequently, this policy left our enemies stronger, and America weaker, than before. The dominant alternative to Bush-esque idealism in foreign policy_so-called realism_has made a strong comeback under the tenure of Barack Obama. But this nonjudgmental, supposedly practical approach is precisely what helped unleash the enemy prior to 9/11. The message of the essays in this thematic collection is that only by radically re-thinking our foreign policy in the Middle East can we achieve victory over the enemy that attacked us on 9/11. We need a new moral foundation for our Mideast policy. That new starting point for U.S. policy is the moral ideal championed by the philosopher Ayn Rand: rational self-interest. Implementing this approach entails objectively defining our national interest as protecting the lives and freedoms of Americans_and then taking principled action to safeguard them. The book lays out the necessary steps for achieving victory and for securing America's long-range interests in the volatile Middle East.

In this new book, David Callahan offers a thorough history of ethnic conflicts both before and after the fall of Communism. He outlines the failures and successes of American diplomacy's haphazard approaches to this strife, and offers compelling evidence of the need for a consistent American policy toward ethnic conflict, a policy that should extend beyond the peace of individual countries to international trade, economics, the environment, and more. Callahan's sensible recommendations for how to predict and prevent ethnic conflicts - and intervene when necessary - will prove invaluable for all those interested in the global power of the United States in the next century.

In nine short days, Taliban forces destroyed two decades of American armed statebuilding in Afghanistan. This was no isolated failure. Over the last century, almost every attempt to intervene militarily to prop up or reconstruct an allied state has seen similar dismal outcomes. Why? This book answers that fundamental question. By exploring the factors that hindered success in Afghanistan, Adam Wunische identifies forces common to other unsuccessful U.S. armed statebuilding missions, from Vietnam to Syria, Haiti to Iraq. These forces, he argues, inherently favor insurgencies, forfeit sustainability for quick results, and create dependencies and corruption – all of which undermine the goal of building a state that can stand on its own. Not only that, but most of these forces are inescapable and uncontrollable. This means any future attempts at armed statebuilding will likely also be unwinnable, with costs and consequences far outpacing America’s interests and benefits. Faced with a future likely dominated by proxy wars, Wunische offers a novel way forward to prevent the U.S. from chasing new wars that it is destined to lose.