As President Carter?s ambassador to Nicaragua from 1977?1979, Mauricio Sola£n witnessed a critical moment in Central American history. In U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua, Sola£n outlines the role of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration and explains how this policy with respect to the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 not only failed but helped impede the institutionalization of democracy there. Late in the 1970s, the United States took issue with the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. Moral suasion, economic sanctions, and other peaceful instruments from Washington led to violent revolution in Nicaragua and bolstered a new dictatorial government. A U.S.-supported counterrevolution formed, and Sola£n argues that the United States attempts to this day to determine who rules Nicaragua. Sola£n explores the mechanisms that kept Somoza?s poorly legitimized regime in power for decades, making it the most enduring Latin American authoritarian regime of the twentieth century. Sola£n argues that continual shifts in U.S. international policy have been made in response to previous policies that failed to produce U.S.- friendly international environments. His historical survey of these policy shifts provides a window on the working of U.S. diplomacy and lessons for future policy-making.

A penetrating analysis of the controversial U.S. role in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections-the most closely monitored in history-this book exposes the intervention in the electoral process of a sovereign nation by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy, and private U.S.-based organizations. Robins

This book traces the process through which Nicaraguans defeated US aggression in a highly unequal confrontation.

The new epilogue to Condemned to Repetition covers events, such as the Arias peace plan and the debate over funding for the Contras, through February 1988.

This study of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies reveals the fundamental importance Washington placed on preserving state institutions in Latin America while adopting a much more flexible approach regarding support for elected regimes or dictatorial rulers. The Carter White House decision to dump a longstanding ally, Somoza, and support a regime change was triggered by the appearance of a mass-based social movement led by radical nationalist guerrillas posing a challenge to both the dictatorial regime and, more importantly, the state structure that underpinned it. This book is based on the extensive use of personal interviews and recently declassified U.S. government documents. Among its distinctive features is the emphasis on the pivotal role Washington played in contributing to the long-term survival of the Somoza dictatorship. It is the first detailed study, based on original research, of Nixon and Ford policy toward Nicaragua, and it contains the most detailed discussion of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the early period of Sandinista rule.

In this sweeping history of United States policy toward Latin America, Lars Schoultz shows that the United States has always perceived Latin America as a fundamentally inferior neighbor, unable to manage its affairs and stubbornly underdeveloped. This perception of inferiority was apparent from the beginning. John Quincy Adams, who first established diplomatic relations with Latin America, believed that Hispanics were lazy, dirty, nasty...a parcel of hogs. In the early nineteenth century, ex-President John Adams declared that any effort to implant democracy in Latin America was as absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies among the birds, beasts, and fishes. Drawing on extraordinarily rich archival sources, Schoultz, one of the country's foremost Latin America scholars, shows how these core beliefs have not changed for two centuries. We have combined self-interest with a civilizing mission--a self-abnegating effort by a superior people to help a substandard civilization overcome its defects. William Howard Taft felt the way to accomplish this task was to knock their heads together until they should maintain peace, while in 1959 CIA Director Allen Dulles warned that the new Cuban officials had to be treated more or less like children. Schoultz shows that the policies pursued reflected these deeply held convictions. While political correctness censors the expression of such sentiments today, the actions of the United States continue to assume the political and cultural inferiority of Latin America. Schoultz demonstrates that not until the United States perceives its southern neighbors as equals can it anticipate a constructive hemispheric alliance.