This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry that was approved and filed with the House of Representatives and the Senate on Dec. 20, 2002. With the exception of portions that were released to the public previously (e.g., the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report, etc.), this version has been declassified by the Intelligence Community prior to its public release. The report of the Joint Inquiry includes findings and conclusions, accompanying narrative, and recommendations. It also includes additional views, of both House and Senate members of their respective committees, which are collected in an Appendix.

In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States on September 11, 2001. This report (available as both S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792) consists of 832 pages (as a single file in PDF Format only) that presents the joint inquiry's findings and conclusions, an accompanying narrative, and a series of recommendations.

In this explosive, controversial, and profoundly alarming insider’s report, Senator Bob Graham reveals faults in America’s national security network severe enough to raise fundamental questions about the competence and honesty of public officials in the CIA, the FBI, and the White House. For ten years, Senator Graham served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, where he had access to some of the nation’s most closely guarded secrets. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Graham co-chaired a historic joint House-Senate inquiry into the intelligence community’s failures. From that investigation and his own personal fact-finding, Graham discovered disturbing evidence of terrorist activity and a web of complicity: • At one point, a terrorist support network conducted some of its operations through Saudi Arabia’s U.S. embassy–and a funding chain for terrorism led to the Saudi royal family. • In February 2002, only four months after combat began in Afghanistan, the Bush administration ordered General Tommy Franks to move vital military resources out of Afghanistan for an operation against Iraq–despite Franks’s privately stated belief that there was a job to finish in Afghanistan, and that the war on terrorism should focus next on terrorist targets in Somalia and Yemen. • Throughout 2002, President Bush directed the FBI to limit its investigations of Saudi Arabia, which supported some and possibly all of the September 11 hijackers. • The White House was so uncooperative with the bipartisan inquiry that its behavior bore all the hallmarks of a cover-up. • The FBI had an informant who was extremely close to two of the September 11 hijackers, and actually housed one of them, yet the existence of this informant and the scope of his contacts with the hijackers were covered up. • There were twelve instances when the September 11 plot could have been discovered and potentially foiled. • Days after 9/11, U.S. authorities allowed some Saudis to fly, despite a complete civil aviation ban, after which the government expedited the departure of more than one hundred Saudis from the United States. • Foreign leaders throughout the Middle East warned President Bush of exactly what would happen in a postwar Iraq, and those warnings went either ignored or unheeded. As a result of his Senate work, Graham has become convinced that the attacks of September 11 could have been avoided, and that the Bush administration’s war on terrorism has failed to address the immediate danger posed by al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. His book is a disturbing reminder that at the highest levels of national security, now more than ever, intelligence matters.

In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated against our nation on September 11, 2001. This report consists of 832 pages that presents the joint inquiry's findings and conclusions, plus an accompanying narrative, and a series of recommendations. This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry that was held by the U. S. Congress into the attacks of September 11, 2001. For reasons of printing production it has been produced in two volumes but is otherwise identical to the one volume report initially released by the Congress to the media. The entire narrative report is included in the first volume, and the appendices and supplementary information are included in the second volume.