Countries with unemployment insurance (UI) program can effectively conduct a labor market policy and observe the flow of unemployed-employed. But should we just hand UI over to anyone who has no job? Do individual response to the program in terms of their decision to work or to enjoy more leisure unanimously the same across leisure type characteristic individuals? In a heterogeneous constructed labor search market we derive that introduction of the UI program increases the wage gap between the different individuals when the program impacts the productivity of firm positively. In an empirical investigation of the impact of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment using a job search model, the author specifies a distribution of duration of unemployment that was estimated using maximum likelihood estimation and find that there is in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 97), 3 types of individuals, and the type of leisure individuals present an adverse response to the program: An increase in UI for the highest leisure type leads to a longer duration of unemployment. Whereas the lowest values of leisure do not tend to have an extended duration of unemployment from a positive change in UI. Finally, the response for the type 2 individuals is completely ambiguous as it could either see them having a prolonged duration of unemployment or a shortened period with no work. So a selective increase in unemployment insurance to those with a relatively low value of leisure may decrease the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The second part of the dissertation focuses on modeling money demand and shocks in Cote D'Ivoire for the period of 1960-2009. Unlike Drama and Yao (2010) our result suggests M1 is not in a long-run equilibrium with its determinants real income and expected inflation and therefore unstable. However, the broad definition M2 is cointegrated with its long-run determinants and it is therefore the most appropriate definition of money for the Cote D'Ivoire economy. As a consequence M2 can be used as an alternative to the interest rate as a long run monetary policy instrument.

Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run.

I use three decades of county-level data to estimate the effects of federal unemployment benefit extensions on economic activity. To overcome the reverse causality coming from the fact that benefit extensions are a function of state unemployment rates, I only use the within-state variation in outcomes to identify treatment effects. Identification rests on a differences-in-differences approach which exploits heterogeneity in county exposure to policy changes. To distinguish demand and supply-side channels, I estimate the model separately for tradable and non-tradable sectors. Finally I use benefit extensions as an instrument to estimate local fiscal multipliers of unemployment benefit transfers. I find (i) that the overall impact of benefit extensions on activity is positive, pointing to strong demand effects; (ii) that, even in tradable sectors, there are no negative supply-side effects from work disincentives; and (iii) a fiscal multiplier estimate of 1.92, similar to estimates in the literature for other types of spending.

Modeled after Wisconsin's own unemployment compensation plan in the 1930s, federal unemployment insurance has long been considered one of the most important public policy achievements of the New Deal. Always paying benefits according to legislative and administrative guidelines and never requiring a taxpayer bailout, the program has nonetheless undergone strains induced by structural changes in both the economy and the prevailing political milieu. An outgrowth of a conference to celebrate the program's fiftieth anniversary, the papers collected in this volume describe the history of the program, analyze the strains it has undergone and that it faces in the 1990s, delineate the source of current debates over unemployment compensation, and offer suggestions for the future of the program.