This book outlines a new account of the tacit, meaning tacit knowledge, presuppositions, practices, traditions, and so forth. It includes essays on topics such as underdetermination and mutual understanding, and critical discussions of the major alternative approaches to the tacit, including Bourdieu’s habitus and various practice theories, Oakeshott’s account of tradition, Quentin Skinner’s theory of historical meaning, Harry Collins’s idea of collective tacit knowledge, as well as discussions of relevant cognitive science concepts, such as non-conceptual content, connectionism, and mirror neurons. The new account of tacit knowledge focuses on the fact that in making the tacit explicit, a person is not, as many past accounts have supposed, reading off the content of some sort of shared and fixed tacit scheme of presuppositions, but rather responding to the needs of the Other for understanding.

This book outlines a new account of the tacit, meaning tacit knowledge, presuppositions, practices, traditions, and so forth. It includes essays on topics such as underdetermination and mutual understanding, and critical discussions of the major alternative approaches to the tacit, including Bourdieu’s habitus and various practice theories, Oakeshott’s account of tradition, Quentin Skinner’s theory of historical meaning, Harry Collins’s idea of collective tacit knowledge, as well as discussions of relevant cognitive science concepts, such as non-conceptual content, connectionism, and mirror neurons. The new account of tacit knowledge focuses on the fact that in making the tacit explicit, a person is not, as many past accounts have supposed, reading off the content of some sort of shared and fixed tacit scheme of presuppositions, but rather responding to the needs of the Other for understanding.

Tacit knowledge is the form of implicit knowledge that we rely on for learning. It is invoked in a wide range of intellectual inquiries, from traditional academic subjects to more pragmatically orientated investigations into the nature and transmission of skills and expertise. Notwithstanding its apparent pervasiveness, the notion of tacit knowledge is a complex and puzzling one. What is its status as knowledge? What is its relation to explicit knowledge? What does it mean to say that knowledge is tacit? Can it be measured? Recent years have seen a growing interest from philosophers in understanding the nature of tacit knowledge. Philosophers of science have discussed its role in scientific problem-solving; philosophers of language have been concerned with the speaker's relation to grammatical theories; and phenomenologists have attempted to describe the relation of explicit theoretical knowledge to a background understanding of matters that are taken for granted. This book seeks to bring a unity to these diverse philosophical discussions by clarifying their conceptual underpinnings. In addition the book advances a specific account of tacit knowledge that elucidates the importance of the concept for understanding the character of human cognition, and demonstrates the relevance of the recommended account to those concerned with the communication of expertise. The book will be of interest to philosophers of language, epistemologists, cognitive psychologists and students of theoretical linguistics.

Much of what humans know we cannot say. And much of what we do we cannot describe. For example, how do we know how to ride a bike when we can’t explain how we do it? Abilities like this were called “tacit knowledge” by physical chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, but here Harry Collins analyzes the term, and the behavior, in much greater detail, often departing from Polanyi’s treatment. In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, Collins develops a common conceptual language to bridge the concept’s disparate domains by explaining explicit knowledge and classifying tacit knowledge. Collins then teases apart the three very different meanings, which, until now, all fell under the umbrella of Polanyi’s term: relational tacit knowledge (things we could describe in principle if someone put effort into describing them), somatic tacit knowledge (things our bodies can do but we cannot describe how, like balancing on a bike), and collective tacit knowledge (knowledge we draw that is the property of society, such as the rules for language). Thus, bicycle riding consists of some somatic tacit knowledge and some collective tacit knowledge, such as the knowledge that allows us to navigate in traffic. The intermixing of the three kinds of tacit knowledge has led to confusion in the past; Collins’s book will at last unravel the complexities of the idea. Tacit knowledge drives everything from language, science, education, and management to sport, bicycle riding, art, and our interaction with technology. In Collins’s able hands, it also functions at last as a framework for understanding human behavior in a range of disciplines.

Students tend to steer away from classes that have a high technical content such as science, mathematics, engineering, the medical professions and anything where equations (how about economics?) play an important role. My message is deceptively simple; in order to gain real comprehension over a difficult subject, you need to know how your brain works. One successful approach to understanding your mind applies the philosophical viewpoint of Michael Polanyi's tacit theory of knowledge. This book introduces the need for your mind to create "tacit integrations" and explains how to attain what we call the "Aha" experience. Useful to teachers, coaches, and students, this learning methodology explains the behaviors needed for the attainment of full comprehension in either formal or informal learning situations. Polanyi was a brilliant research chemist who in later years turned his attention to explicating a personal philosophy of science. His self-reflections on how he created discoveries in chemistry offers illumination today into how our own minds work. The recognition of a subconscious level of mental activity (intuition and insight) is becoming a contemporary research topic and this book finds parallels between Polanyi and recent breakthroughs in cognitive psychology and selected neuroscience research. His tacit theory of knowledge, largely ignored among educational practitioners, is still alive today within knowledge management, medical training, and theological philosophy. This oversight is a shame and needs corrected. If you have no idea what is meant by a tacit integration (along with the necessary background for understanding it), you are missing valuable insights that show how you can put your brain into high gear. The tacit theory of knowledge informs constructivism and brings alive the dichotomy between explicit and implicit learning (also declarative and procedural knowledge). Polanyi died worried that his work would die with him. Let's not allow that to continue! Discovering how to apply tacit knowledge in learning and teaching can be a rewarding experience.

In architecture, tacit knowledge plays a substantial role in both the design process and its reception. The essays in this book explore the tacit dimension of architecture in its aesthetic, material, cultural, design-based, and reflexive understanding of what we build. Tacit knowledge, described in 1966 by Michael Polanyi as what we ‘can know but cannot tell’, often denotes knowledge that escapes quantifiable dimensions of research. Much of architecture’s knowledge resides beneath the surface, in nonverbal instruments such as drawings and models that articulate the spatial imagination of the design process. Awareness of the tacit dimension helps to understand the many facets of the spaces we inhabit, from the ideas of the architect to the more hidden assumptions of our cultures. Beginning in the studio, where students are guided into becoming architects, the book follows a path through the tacit knowledge present in materials, conceptual structures, and the design process, revealing how the tacit dimension leads to craftsmanship and the situated knowledge of architecture-in-the-world. Contributors: Tom Avermaete (ETH Zürich), Margitta Buchert (Leibniz-Universität Hannover), Christoph Grafe (Bergische Universität Wuppertal), Mari Lending (The Oslo School of Architecture and Design), Angelika Schnell (Academy of Fine Arts Vienna), Eireen Schreurs (Delft University of Technology), Lara Schrijver (University of Antwerp)

Understanding the complexity of tactic knowledge has become increasingly important to the enhancement of organizational flow. Tacit Knowledge in Organizational Learning aims to advocate the need for ?human factor? consideration from a (tactic) knowledge capital point of view. Tacit Knowledge in Organizational Learning offers academians and practitioners an illustration of the importance of tacit knowledge to an organization, presenting a means to measure and track tacit knowledge in individuals and recommendations on firm attributes and their ideal utilization of the tacit knowledge resource.