A report by the Dept. of Defense¿s Command and Control Research Program. Contents: (1) Complexity in Natural and Economic Systems; (2) Concepts for Warfare from Complexity Theory; (3) Evidence for Complex Emergent Behavior in Historical Data; (4) Mathematical Modeling of Complexity, Knowledge, and Conflict; (5) An Extended Example of the Dynamics of Local Collaboration and Clustering, and Some Final Thoughts. Appendix: Optimal Control with a Unique Control Solution. Tables and figures.

Distributed Networked Operations describes a refinement of what popularly has been called "network centric operations." Distributed networked operations envision combat conducted by large numbers of diverse, small units-rather than by small numbers of generally homogenous, large units. In theory and to a significant extent in practice in Afghanistan and Iraq, distributed networked operations involve a mixed bag of naval, ground and air units, none of which is individually as powerful as a fleet, air wing or armored division. Author Jeff Cares discusses distributed networked operations from the perspective of adaptive control theory and details implications for force structure, hardware employment, and networked competition. Jeff presents a formal model of Information Age combat and explores the civilian business applications of the theory.

This book argues that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) influences how developed militaries operate in the same fashion that an operating system influences the development of computer software. It examines three inter-related issues: the overwhelming military power of the United States; the growing influence of NCW on military thinking; and the centrality of coalition operations in modern military endeavours. Irrespective of terrorist threats and local insurgencies, the present international structure is remarkably stable - none of the major powers seeks to alter the system from its present liberal character, as demonstrated by the lack of a military response to US military primacy. This primacy privileges the American military doctrine and thus the importance of NCW, which promises a future of rapid, precise, and highly efficient operations, but also a future predicated on the ‘digitization’ of the battle space. Participation in future American-led military endeavours will require coalition partners to be networked: ‘interoperability’ will therefore be a key consideration of a partner’s strategic worth. Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international security, US foreign policy and international relations in general.

The move on the part of the US military, which began in 1996, to Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), meant the combination of sensor grids, C&C grids, and precision targeting to increase speed to command, and represented a military offset. Along with networking comes exposure to cyber attacks, attacks that will be used in future wars.

This book interrogates the philosophical backdrop of Clausewitzian notions of war, and asks whether modern, network-centric militaries can still be said to serve the 'political'. In light of the emerging theories and doctrines of Network-Centric War (NCW), this book traces the philosophical backdrop against which the more common theorizations of war and its conduct take place. Tracing the historical and philosophical roots of modern war from the 17th Century through to the present day, this book reveals that far from paralyzing the project of re-problematisating war, the emergence of NCW affords us an opportunity to rethink war in new and philosophically challenging ways. This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, social theory, war studies and political theory/IR. Manabrata Guha is Assistant Professor (ISSSP) at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India.

For decades, navies have been major sponsors of space developments for the purposes of secure communications and precise navigation: without satellite navigation a submarine-based deterrent force would have been impossible, and the accuracy of the Tomahawk cruise missile in the Gulf War was entirely dependent on such technology. This book chronicles these developments, describing the systems themselves and concluding with an analysis of future possibilities.