Each era brings with it new techniques and methods of waging a war. While military scholars and experts have mastered land, sea, air and space warfare, time has come that they studied the art of cyberwar too. Our neighbours have acquired the capabilities to undertake this new form of asymmetric form of warfare. India too therefore needs to acquire the capabilities to counter their threat. Cyber space seems to have invaded every aspect of our life. More and more systems whether public or private are getting automated and networked. This high dependence of our critical infrastructure on Information and Communication Technology exposes it to the vulnerabilities of cyberspace. Enemy now can target such infrastructure through the cyberspace and degrade/ destroy them. This implies that the critical information infrastructure of the country and military networks today are both equally vulnerable to enemy’s cyberattacks. India therefore must protect its critical information infrastructure as she would protect the military infrastructure in the battlefield. Public – Private Partnership model is the only model which would succeed in doing so. While the Government needs to lay down the policies and frame the right laws, private sector needs to invest into cyber security. Organisations at national level and at the level of armed forces need to be raised which can protect our assets and are also capable of undertaking offensive cyber operations. This book is an attempt to understand various nuances of cyber warfare and how it affects our national security. Based on the cyber threat environment, the books recommends a framework of cyber doctrine and cyber strategies as well as organisational structure of various organisations which a nation needs to invest in.

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with cyber warfare in general bringing out the unique characteristics of cyber space, the recent cyber attack on Estonia and the Stuxnet attack on Iranian Nuclear facilities, how the established Principles of War can be applied in cyberspace, cyber strategy of US and China, offensive and defensive aspects of cyber warfare cyber deterrence and the new challenge facing the militaries the world over- leadership in cyber domain. Part 2 is devoted to the Indian context. It discusses in detail the impact of ICT on the life of an ordinary Indian citizen, the cyber challenges facing the country and the implications for the Indian Armed Forces. A few recommendations have been summarised in the end.

Impending technological advances will widen an adversary’s attack plane over the next decade. Visualizing what the future will hold, and what new threat vectors could emerge, is a task that traditional planning mechanisms struggle to accomplish given the wide range of potential issues. Understanding and preparing for the future operating environment is the basis of an analytical method known as Threatcasting. It is a method that gives researchers a structured way to envision and plan for risks ten years in the future. Threatcasting uses input from social science, technical research, cultural history, economics, trends, expert interviews, and even a little science fiction to recognize future threats and design potential futures. During this human-centric process, participants brainstorm what actions can be taken to identify, track, disrupt, mitigate, and recover from the possible threats. Specifically, groups explore how to transform the future they desire into reality while avoiding an undesired future. The Threatcasting method also exposes what events could happen that indicate the progression toward an increasingly possible threat landscape. This book begins with an overview of the Threatcasting method with examples and case studies to enhance the academic foundation. Along with end-of-chapter exercises to enhance the reader’s understanding of the concepts, there is also a full project where the reader can conduct a mock Threatcasting on the topic of “the next biological public health crisis.” The second half of the book is designed as a practitioner’s handbook. It has three separate chapters (based on the general size of the Threatcasting group) that walk the reader through how to apply the knowledge from Part I to conduct an actual Threatcasting activity. This book will be useful for a wide audience (from student to practitioner) and will hopefully promote new dialogues across communities and novel developments in the area.

In a world of increasing dependence on information technology, the prevention of cyberattacks on a nation's important computer and communications systems and networks is a problem that looms large. Given the demonstrated limitations of passive cybersecurity defense measures, it is natural to consider the possibility that deterrence might play a useful role in preventing cyberattacks against the United States and its vital interests. At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Research Council undertook a two-phase project aimed to foster a broad, multidisciplinary examination of strategies for deterring cyberattacks on the United States and of the possible utility of these strategies for the U.S. government. The first phase produced a letter report providing basic information needed to understand the nature of the problem and to articulate important questions that can drive research regarding ways of more effectively preventing, discouraging, and inhibiting hostile activity against important U.S. information systems and networks. The second phase of the project entailed selecting appropriate experts to write papers on questions raised in the letter report. A number of experts, identified by the committee, were commissioned to write these papers under contract with the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned papers were discussed at a public workshop held June 10-11, 2010, in Washington, D.C., and authors revised their papers after the workshop. Although the authors were selected and the papers reviewed and discussed by the committee, the individually authored papers do not reflect consensus views of the committee, and the reader should view these papers as offering points of departure that can stimulate further work on the topics discussed. The papers presented in this volume are published essentially as received from the authors, with some proofreading corrections made as limited time allowed.

Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought. The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this. Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success. A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, The Army and Vietnam demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight—lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.