A new framework for understanding contemporary administrative law, through a comparative analysis of case law from Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, and New Zealand. The author argues that the field is structured by four values: individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy.

Explores the English origins of the principles of judicial review in common law jurisdictions and autochthonous pressures for their adaptation.

Schwartz provides a masterly exposition of administrative law through a comparative study of the French droit administratif, arguably the most sophisticated Continental model. As Vanderbilt points out in his introduction, this is an important field that involves much more than administrative procedure. It deals directly with some of the most crucial issues of modern government regarding the distribution of power between governmental units, the resulting effect on the freedom of the individual and on the strength and stability of the state. Reprint of the sole edition. "[T]his book represents a significant achievement.... Unlike so many volumes that roll off the press these days, it fills a real need; and, though perhaps not the definitive work in English on the subject, it fills it extremely well." --Frederic S. Burin, Columbia Law Review 54 (1954) 1016 Bernard Schwartz [1923-1997] was professor of law and director of the Institute of Comparative Law, New York University. He was the author of over fifty books, including The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World (1956), the five-volume Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (1963-68), Constitutional Law: A Textbook (2d ed., 1979), Administrative Law: A Casebook (4th ed., 1994) and A History of the Supreme Court (1993).

For centuries, courts across the common law world have developed systems of law by building bodies of judicial decisions. In deciding individual cases, common law courts settle litigation and move the law in new directions. By virtue of their place at the top of the judicial hierarchy, courts at the apex of common law systems are unique in that their decisions and, in particular, the language used in those decisions, resonate through the legal system. Although both the common law and apex courts have been studied extensively, scholars have paid less attention to the relationship between the two. By analyzing apex courts and the common law from multiple angles, this book offers an entry point for scholars in disciplines related to law - such as political science, history, and sociology - who are seeking a deeper understanding and new insights as to how the common law applies to and is relevant within their own disciplines.

Paul Daly develops a theory concerning the appropriate allocation of authority between courts and administrative bodies.

Offers a distinctive account of the rule of law and legislative sovereignty within the work of Albert Venn Dicey.

Winner of the Scribes Book Award “As brilliantly imaginative as it is urgently timely.” —Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Harvard Law School “At no time more than the present, a defense of expertise-based governance and administration is sorely needed, and this book provides it with gusto.” —Frederick Schauer, author of The Proof A highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? America has long been divided over these questions, but the debate has recently taken on more urgency and spilled into the streets. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed so long as public officials are constrained by morality and guided by stable rules. Officials should make clear rules, ensure transparency, and never abuse retroactivity, so that current guidelines are not under constant threat of change. They should make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing contradictory ones. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. In more robust form, they could address some of the concerns of critics who decry the “deep state” and yearn for its downfall. “Has something to offer both critics and supporters...a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the modern state.” —Review of Politics “The authors freely admit that the administrative state is not perfect. But, they contend, it is far better than its critics allow.” —Wall Street Journal