Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents. Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents. Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

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U.N. inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs resumed in November 2002 after a 4-year hiatus. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 granted Iraq a final chance to disarm. Given Iraq's history of thwarting WMD inspections, many have low expectations for the success of inspections. This report, which will be updated, analyzes the challenges and opportunities of inspections in light of new U.N. Security Council authorities and Congress's authorization to use U.S. force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243). The success of these inspections will have a direct impact on whether U.S. military force is used to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. On the plus side, new inspections have strengthened authorities under the new U.N. resolution, including unimpeded access to all sites and interviewing Iraqi officials privately, and they utilize new technologies. There is also a better relationship between U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) than there was between its predecessor and the IAEA. Inspections, rather than military strikes, could encourage defectors to provide critical information and might facilitate uncovering links between WMD and terrorism. Inspections conducted under the threat of military strikes have likely increased the pressure on Iraq to comply. On the negative side, inspectors face new practical, technical, and political challenges. New regulations for sharing intelligence and inspector recruitment may hinder inspections and Iraq has had four years to potentially hide weapons activities in dual-use facilities. The threat of war could increase pressure on inspectors to produce some definitive knowledge and could potentially politicize their investigations.