At present arms and defence-related technologies cannot be exported from the US without an export licence. The system is burdensome and time consuming and discourages US/UK industrial collaboration. This report examines the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, which would seek to establish a new framework for arms trade and technology transfer between US and UK by removing the need for a licence in certain categories. Treaty is only a framework agreement as the detailed operation is still to be set out in Implementing Arrangements. In the expectation of satisfactory Implementing Arrangements the Committee endorse the Treaty.

This report sets out the work of the Committee during 2007. The report highlights aspects of the Committee's working practices which depart from previous practice or which may otherwise be of interest. In particular it draws attention to the webforum held during its inquiry into Medical Care for the Armed Forces; its taking of evidence outside Westminster, in Birmingham and Edinburgh; and the growing amount of informal activities of the Committee. It also underlines the importance of visits to the Armed Forces on operational deployments. Whilst the MoD was commended for overall timeliness in responding to the Committee's inquiries, in one inquiry: 'UK Defence: commitments and resources'; there was a delay which hindered the progress of the Committee

The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) believe that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements on the export of arms to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression. The Committees have scrutinised in unprecedented detail the Government's latest (2010) Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls (HC 1402, session 2011-12, ISBN 9780102973662), the Government's quarterly information on individual export licence approvals and refusals, and the Government's policies and performance on arms export controls and on arms control generally. The Committees conclude that the Government's review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as "an internal review" and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Government's stated policy of transparency on arms exports. And whilst the Government's introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported are not used for internal repression overseas because in many cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Government should extend its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide. Annex 7 of the report gives selected arms export licence approvals by the Government to countries of human rights concern, and the report also contains details of the extant UK Government approved arms export licences to Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

As Britain and the United States commemorate five decades of the special nuclear relationship embodied in the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA), two leading research institutes--one on either side of the Atlantic--have collaborated to examine that history. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, enlisted senior officials, scientists, academics, and members of industry who have been involved in the implementation of the MDA over the years. The contributors were asked to recount how the U.S.-UK nuclear relationship flourished despite such obstacles as the halt in the scientific cooperation that had spurred the Manhattan Project; the Suez crisis; and sharp disagreements over scientific, political, and technical issues. They were also asked to look to the future of this unparalleled transatlantic relationship. Abstracts from 36 oral histories (taken with, among others, Des Browne, UK secretary of state for defence; James Schlesinger, former U.S. secretary of energy; and Harold Brown, former U.S. secretary of defense) add to the historical dimension of this work. The resulting collection of histories, analyses, and anecdotes provides valuable reading for an understanding of how the two nations were drawn together by a common threat during a turbulent era, as well as how they will face future challenges in a radically changed security environment. -- Amazon.com.

This volume constitutes the first ever attempt to establish a basis for comparative research on defence procurement regulation. For decades there has been repeated emphasis on the extent to which barriers to trade in Europe and the US prevent a more competitive defence market. Transatlantic Defence Procurement offers the first analysis of the potential impact of defence procurement regulation itself as a barrier to trade between the US and the EU. Part I examines the external dimension of a new EU Defence Procurement Directive, focusing on its implications for third countries, in particular the US. Part II examines foreign access and treatment under US law. Part III maps a future research agenda that is essential for a more systematic understanding of legal barriers to transatlantic defence trade. The book provides context for future initiatives, ranging from reformed market access arrangements to a Defence Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and beyond.

The mission of the MoD's (Ministry of Defence's) Defence Equipment and Support (DE & S) organisation is to equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future. Support to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken priority and the organisation has performed well. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system remains highly effective in enabling vital equipment to be provided quickly to the two theatres to meet rapidly changing threats, but there are concerns that UORs represent a partial failure to equip our forces for predicted expeditionary operations, and on their effects on the core budget in future years. DE & S' performance in procuring longer-term equipment declined significantly in 2007-08. The forecast costs for the 20 largest defence projects increased by £205 million and the forecast delays increased by some 100 months in the year. The improvements promised by both the long-standing application of the principles of 'smart procurement' and the more recent formation of the DE & S organisation appear not to have materialised. The FRES (Future Rapid Effect System) programme has been a fiasco, being poorly conceived and managed from the outset. The Committee condemns the failure to date to publish an updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy and considers that its continuing absence increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future requirements of our Armed Forces. Finally, the UK's future military capability depends on the investment made today in Research and Development. Sufficient funding for defence research needs to be ring-fenced and the MoD must recognise the very high priority of research and reverse the recent cut in research spending.

Awakening to China's Rise delivers the first post-Cold War history of how Europe's major powers (Britain, France, and Germany) have responded to the perceived security challenge posed by China's rising assertiveness both in the Asia-Pacific and in Europe.