For this study, a group of Russian authors were commissioned to describe and assess the arms trade policies and practices of Russia under new domestic and international conditions. The contributors, drawn from the government, industry, and academic communities, offer a wide range of reports on the political, military, economic, and industrial implications of Russian arms transfers, as well as specific case studies of key bilateral arms transfer relationships.

This book, first published in 1991, examines Britain’s defence and foreign policy of the 1980s , and explores a variety of alternative roles for Britain in the radically changed circumstances of the 1990s. The authors analyse the full range of major British security issues and developments, including the use of force and the role of conventional forces, the significance of the Anglo-American special relationship, relations with Europe, the Third World and the Soviet Union, and the unique problem of Northern Ireland. They particularly address the question of whether international policy in ‘the Thatcher years’ has marked a decisive break with earlier post-war policy or has rather been marked by shifts of emphasis within an essentially stable framework.

In the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, the term 'intelligence failure' became synonymous with the Blair Government and how it had used intelligence to construct a case for war. This book examines British secret intelligence over the thirty years preceding its very public failings. From the Soviet Union to South Africa and Libya, Mark Wilkinson provides a detailed analysis and vivid account of the development and functioning of Britain's intelligence agencies in the struggle against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Based on archival research and interviews with key players in the intelligence establishment, he shows how a handful of chemical and biological weapons experts battled to make their voices heard. They had evidence that illegal weapons development was taking place but were continually rebuffed by adversaries in Whitehall. Fascinating, surprising and sometimes shocking, Before Intelligence Failed is a compelling account of what was known about chemical and biological weapons proliferation before the Iraq War.

"If peace breaks out, can arms control be far behind?" According to Colin S. Gray, this sardonic motto describes events of the 1990s just as well as it did those of the 1920s. Gray offers a provocative history of twentieth-century attempts at arms limitation, as he challenges the fundamental assumptions of arms control theory. Arms control has never worked, he concludes, because it never can. Existing approaches to arms control appeal to common sense, but they are logically unsound and inherently impractical, Gray argues, because they fail to take political realities into account. He outlines their inadequacies in what he calls the Arms Control Paradox: the more motivated nations are to fight one another, the less interested they will be in supporting significant arms limitations. Under these conditions, arms control agreements must be, to echo a phrase of George Will's, either impossible or unimportant. Documenting the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s and the initiatives to limit strategic nuclear arms from 1969 to the present, Gray seeks to demonstrate that the fortunes of negotiated arms limitation have merely reflected the temperature of international relations, rather than influencing those relations. National security analysts, students and scholars of international relations, and others interested in arms control issues will want to read House of Cards and debate its conclusions.

Keohane examines the main British political parties' attitude to Britain's policy on three key security issues, namely the use of force, nuclear weapons and security in Northern Ireland. He analyses how each of the parties viewed conflicts at Suez, the Falklands and the Gulf, elucidates their perspective on nuclear weapons and concludes with a review of their attitude towards security in Northern Ireland. The book finds the parties' policies reflect their distinctive views on security while international conditions often severely affect the policy pursued.