Amongst the products of the French Revolution, the idea of nation exerted the deepest influence on the East. In the Ottoman Empire, the concept bore a fresh idea of an Ottoman nation even though the term Ottoman in itself comprised many ethnic groups. Alongside Ottoman nationalism, Turkish nationalism arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century; it became predominant in the Young Turk era. Organizers of Turkish nationalism were scattered not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in Russia. This book analyzes such complicated aspects of the development of nationalism in the Young Turk era with careful attention to both specific and general problems. The author has chosen four leading nationalist periodicals as a clue for settling the issue. He has thereby demonstrated that these periodicals are very useful for history and political science studies as well as for that of literature. In addition, a table of contents of the periodicals dealt with in the text has been added as an appendix, which should be of considerable benefit to concerned scholars and students.

The grand narrative of "The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building" is that of the essential continuity of the late Ottoman Empire with the Republic of Turkey that was founded in 1923. Erik J. Zurcher shows that Kemal's 'ideological toolkit', which included positivism, militarism, nationalism and a state-centred world view, was shared by many other Young Turks. Authoritarian rule, a one-party state, a legal framework based on European principles, advanced European-style bureaucracy, financial administration, military and educational reforms and state-control of Islam, can all be found in the late Ottoman Empire, as can policies of demographic engineering. The book focuses on the attempts of the Young Turks to save their empire through forced modernization as well as on the attempts of their Kemalist successors to build a strong national state. The decade of almost continuous warfare, ethnic conflict and forced migration between 1911 and 1922 forms the background to these attempts and accordingly occupies a central position in this volume. This is a powerful history reflecting and contributing to the latest research from a leading historian of modern Turkey. It is essential for all readers interested in the history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, and for an understanding of a key player in the politics of the Middle East and Europe.

The first decade of the twentieth century was the Ottoman Empire's 'imperial twilight'. As the Empire fell away however, the beginnings of a young, vibrant and radical Turkish nationalism took root in Anatolia. The summer of 1908 saw a group known as the Young Turks attempt to revitalise Turkey with a constitutional revolution aimed at reducing the power of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhammid II- who was seen to preside over the Ottoman Empire's decline. Drawing on popular support for the efence of the Ottoman Empire's Balkan territories in particular, the Young Turks promised to build a nation from the people up, rather than from the top down. Here, Y. Dogan Cetinkaya analyses the history of the Boycott Movement, a series of nationwide public meetings and protests which enshrined the Turkish democractic voice. He argues that the 1908 revolution the Young Turks engendered was in fact a crucial link in the wave of constitutional revolutions at the beginning of the twentieth century- in Russia (1905), Iran (1906), Mexico (1910) and China (1911) and as such should be studied in the context of the wider rise of democratic nationalism across the world. The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement is the first history to show how this phenomenon laid the foundations for the modern Turkish state and will be essential reading for students and scholars of the Ottoman Empire and of the history of Modern Turkey.

*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading In August 2017, Turkey's President Recip Tayyip Erdogan gave a directive to the Foreign Ministry to go into ravaged Syria and rescue an 87-year-old Turkish man stranded in Damascus by the civil war. The elderly gentleman lived his life simply and quietly. He disliked drawing attention to himself, and he was grieving for his wife who had just died. The man called himself Dundar Abdulkerim Osmanoglu, but many affixed the title Sehzade ("Prince") to his name, for he was Head of the imperial House of Osman and heir to the defunct throne of the Ottoman Empire. His ancestors had created an Empire that had lasted for over 600 years and caused the greatest rulers of both the Muslim East and the Christian West to tremble. Osmanoglu was the great grandson of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1841-1918), who was notable for introducing constitutional government to the Ottoman Empire. He had been brought reluctantly to this act by a revolution guided by a group of political activists known as the Young Turks. They believed they could save the dying Ottoman state by instituting reforms that would transform the empire into a secular constitutional state on par with the Great Powers of Europe. They also believed that the path to such a change lay with Turkish nationalism rather than imperialism. Abdu Hamid did not share that vision, so he was eventually deposed. Erdogan is the political heir of the Young Turks. Turkey developed into a secular and seemingly Western state, a member of the NATO alliance and an aspirant for membership in the European Union, but Erdogan seems to be reaching back to the imperial past, and he appeals more to the authoritarianism of Abdul Hamid II than the liberalism of the Young Turks. Similarly, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party opposes the secularism that has dominated Turkish national life for almost 100 years. Dundar Ali has never expressed any desire to return to the throne of his ancestors - in fact, he did not wish to leave Damascus, where he had been born and where he worked. It is ironic then, that a great-grandson of the revolution has reached out to the great-grandson of the enemy of the revolution and embraced his legacy as his own. Dundar Ali now lives in Istanbul, the former imperial capital once known internationally as Constantinople. Interest in the former imperial family and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire is increasing within Turkey, encouraged by Erdogan, and there now seems to be a rivalry growing between secularists and Ottomanists, not unlike that which arose between the Young Turks and the Ottomanists in the 19th century. The empire's inclusiveness, which marked it as a direct successor of the Byzantine Empire, was most certainly challenged by an aging leadership, and the Ottoman Empire's inability to create a shared identity, a weak central state, and growing inner dissensions were some of the main factors explaining its long demise. Such a failure also explains the need for the creation of a new form of identity, which was ultimately provided by Mustafa Kemal, the founding father of modern Turkey, a firm critic of the Young Turks. As this all suggests, the story of the Young Turks and the last years of the Ottoman Sultanate is a complex and interesting one. It is the history of a state struggling to survive against seemingly impossible odds, featuring a long battle for the minds and souls of the inhabitants of a declining empire between nationalism and liberal imperialism. It is a struggle that has produced not only modern Turkey but several states in the Balkans and the Middle East as they exist today. The Young Turks were triumphant, but in many ways it was a Pyrrhic victory, because this triumph led to the further disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and its final collapse when they disastrously plunged the empire into the First World War.

Nationalism was a defining characteristic of Turkey in the twentieth century and was a central driving force in Kemal Ataturk's foundation of the Republic in 1923. How did the prominence of Kemalist ways of political thinking affect its people and policies? Is Turkey making progress towards post-nationalism or post-Kemalism in the twenty-first century? To what extent has Turkey's EU candidature been a vehicle of transformation since 1999 and what would EU membership mean for modern Turkey? This book explores the historical impact of Turkish nationalism, anti- liberalism and Westernization and examines the conditions that have contributed to the country's evolution from a quasi-religious Kemalism. Tracing the development of nationalism from its founding period before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 to Kemalism and the present AKP government- and analysing key factors such as the position of minorities in the Turkification process and the influence of religious politics-this strong and significant contribution casts a new light on a vivid international debate.