Proper doctrine for close support of American ground forces by airpower has been a tumultuous issue since the first days of combat aircraft. Air and ground leaders struggled with interservice rivalry, parochialism, employment paradigms, and technological roadblocks while seeking the optimum balance of missions given the unique speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft. Neither ground force concepts of airpower as self-defense and extended organic artillery, nor air force theories focused on command of the air and strategic attack fit the middle ground of close air support (CAS), leaving a doctrinal void prior to American combat in World War II. This thesis focuses on the critical period from September 1939 through the doctrinal and practical crucible of North Africa, which eventually produced a resoundingly successful system. Theoretical and practical changes in organization and command, airpower roles, and the tactical air control system are examined, with subarea focus on cooperation and communications technology. Upon examination, discerning leadership, able to transcend earlier compromises and failures, emerges as the essential element for CAS success during the war. While many airpower concepts proved valid, air-ground cooperation through liaison proved indispensable, a lesson repeated even today.

En gennemgang af udviklingen inden for taktisk flystøtte

Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.