An inspiring analysis of events surrounding two women's attempted assassination of the Emperor of Japan, and the separate penalties faced by these women both in terms of their death sentences and the wider context surrounding their lives.

From 1932 to 1945, the Japanese military forced hundreds of thousands of women across Asia into "comfort stations" where they were repeatedly raped and tortured. This volume features the personal narratives of twelve women who were kidnapped and forced into sexual slavery. In exposing previously hidden aspects of the system, it also exposes the full extent of the injustices suffered by these women, and the conditions that caused them.

How women figured in the expansion of the national body of the Japanese empire

This work on Hiratsuka Raichō at last fully assesses her key role in the history of the Japanese women's movement. It provides a full and contextual analysis of the life (1886-1971) and work of this leading Japanese feminist, all in the light of the changes affecting women in Japan. At the same time the author compares her working with similar historical shifts and movements in western countries, notably Great Britain and the United States. International comparisons at the level of personal biography and associated ideas are made, to see the influence of Western feminists on Hiratsuka's feminism. Hiratsuka is compared with other Japanese feminists, whereby her pivotal role in the history of the Japanese women's movement becomes clear. With extensive footnotes for further reference - and research -, a number of appendices, a detailed bilingual glossary and bibliography; a true reference on an important subject.

"Portions of chapter 4 were previously published in slightly different form in "So bad she's good: the masochist's heroine in Japan, Abe Sada," in Bad girls of Japan, edited by Laura Miller and Jan Bardsley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 141-67"--T.p. verso.

A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific. When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable. In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West. We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it. Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.