What is pragmatism? Is it a means to an end, or an end in itself? Is it antithetical to ideology or morality? Arguing that pragmatism is a skill much more than an attribute, Phua examines how viewing it in this way can help achieve better foreign policy outcomes. He examines and contrasts the ways in which the United States, China and Singapore have incorporated pragmatism into their approaches to foreign policy. In doing so he debunks dualistic myths around pragmatism and ideology and promotes the view of pragmatism as a skill that can be developed. An essential primer for students, analysts and policymakers, with a fresh and practical approach to pragmatism.

This volume explores how China is adapting to international norms and practices while still giving primacy to its national interests. It examines China's strategic behaviour on the world stage, particularly in its relationships with major powers and Asian neighbours.

This is the second volume in a series which will examine the credibility of U.S. institutions, policies and leadership. The series is being brought out by the White Burket Miller Center of Public Affairs through the assistance of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The main theme of Professor Crabb's study of pragmatism is that the credibility of philosophies of politics and foreign policies rests on their intellectual foundations. However, the public's acceptance of a philosophy depends on its ability to understand its assumptions and tenets. A philosophy may be sound intellectually but lacking in public understanding and comprehension. ISBN 0-8191-4423-1: $16.50.

The Thucydides trap and a US-China face-off are not structurally inevitable; US-China relations are what the US and China make of them. Phua focuses on the ability to see "US as US" and "China as China" to trigger both countries’ cultural tendencies towards pragmatism. Phua examines China’s arduous journey to fit in the Westphalian system, the deep cultural misunderstandings by the West of Sunzi’s The Art of War, and attempts to offer an inside-out cultural synthesis of classical and modern Chinese thought as a proxy of their operational code, beyond the standard clichés about Confucian and Daoist thought. He builds on Jervis’ perception and misperception as well as Alastair Johnston’s cultural realism. Readers will benefit from a culturally-Chinese, western-educated and politically neutral understanding of "China as China". An essential primer for academics, practitioners and students of international relations, diplomacy and Chinese culture.

Phua focuses on applying the best of corporate strategy and innovation tools and praxis into the policy process with the aim of devising a coherent policy strategy–innovation framework and process. Government and business strategies differ in their operating assumptions and variables, but the strategy process is more similar than is often perceived. Phua debunks the government versus business dichotomy and demonstrates the potential for cross-learning between both domains. Readers will benefit the most by reading this book in tandem with Phua’s other works on strategy also featured in this series. This book is an essential primer for academics, practitioners and learners of public policy, strategy, innovation and applied problem-solving.

This book offers a fresh assessment of George W. Bush’s foreign policies. It is not designed to offer an evaluation of the totality of George W. Bush’s foreign policy. Instead, the analysis will focus on the key aspects of his foreign and security policy record, in each case considering the interplay between principle and pragmatism. The underpinning contention here is that policy formulation and implementation across Bush’s two terms can more usefully be analysed in terms of shades of grey, rather than the black and white hues in which it has often been painted. Thus, in some key policy areas it will be seen that the overall record was more pragmatic and successful than his many critics have been prepared to give him credit for. The president and his advisers were sometimes prepared to alter and amend their policy direction, on occasion significantly. Context and personalities, interpersonal and interagency, both played a role here. Where these came together most visibly – for instance in connection with dual impasses over Iraq and Iran – exigencies on the ground sometimes found expression in personnel changes. In turn, the changing fortunes of Bush’s first term principals presaged policy changes in his second. What emerges from a more detached study of key aspects of the Bush administration – during a complicated and challenging period in the United States’ post-Cold War history, marked by the dramatic emergence of international Islamist terrorism as the dominant international security threat – is a more complex picture than any generalization can ever hope to sustain, regardless of how often it is repeated. This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, international politics and security studies.

This book seeks to uncover a clear picture of Barack Obama’s grand strategy, the overarching methods applied to identify and achieve national interests in a global setting. Pressed for an “Obama doctrine” during his final years in office, the President claimed a simple international relations approach: applying all tools at his disposal before resorting for military force. Critics, however, remain unimpressed. They charge the administration with strategic incoherence and weak leadership. Stepping away from ideological and theoretical commitments, Shively applies a simple framework for grand strategy, one that also deepens our systematic understanding. After untangling a complex history and narrating three cases of tumult in 2009, 2011, and 2014, Shively characterizes Obama’s grand strategy as “pragmatic internationalism” and argues that it was a promising but poorly implemented approach.