This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

This book brings together a group of leading economic historians to examine how institutions, innovation, and industrialization have determined the development of nations. Presented in honor of Joel Mokyr—arguably the preeminent economic historian of his generation—these wide-ranging essays address a host of core economic questions. What are the origins of markets? How do governments shape our economic fortunes? What role has entrepreneurship played in the rise and success of capitalism? Tackling these and other issues, the book looks at coercion and exchange in the markets of twelfth-century China, sovereign debt in the age of Philip II of Spain, the regulation of child labor in nineteenth-century Europe, meat provisioning in pre–Civil War New York, aircraft manufacturing before World War I, and more. The book also features an essay that surveys Mokyr's important contributions to the field of economic history, and an essay by Mokyr himself on the origins of the Industrial Revolution. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Gergely Baics, Hoyt Bleakley, Fabio Braggion, Joyce Burnette, Louis Cain, Mauricio Drelichman, Narly Dwarkasing, Joseph Ferrie, Noel Johnson, Eric Jones, Mark Koyama, Ralf Meisenzahl, Peter Meyer, Joel Mokyr, Lyndon Moore, Cormac Ó Gráda, Rick Szostak, Carolyn Tuttle, Karine van der Beek, Hans-Joachim Voth, and Simone Wegge.

Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.

Does leadership affect economic growth and development? Is leadership an exogenous determinant or an endogenous outcome of growth and development processes? Can we differentiate between the two? Do leaders decisions and actions vary in importance over various stages in the process, at least in successful cases? How important is choosing the right economic model? To what extent does leadership affect the explicit or implicit time horizons of policy choices? Is leadership an important determinant of inclusiveness in growth? In what ways do leaders build consensus or institutions to allow time for the economic plan to work? What challenges does economic success generate? How do successful leaders adapt to new problems such as income inequality and a rising middle class? Does the creation of new institutions play any role in solving these problems? Why do leaders often choose second best political economic compromises in economic development? This book has been prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development to evaluate the state of knowledge on the relationship between leadership and economic growth. It does not pretend to provide all the answers, but does review the evidence, identify insights and offers examples of leaders making decisions and acting in ways that enhance economic growth. It examines a variety of topics including leaders roles in: promoting national unity, building good solid institutions, choosing innovative and localized policies, and creating political consensus for long run policy implementation. Written by prominent academics and actual policy makers, Leadership and Growth seeks to create a better understanding of the role of leadership in growth and to encourage further studies of the role of leadership in economic growth.

The result of two years work by 19 experienced policymakers and two Nobel prize-winning economists, 'The Growth Report' is the most complete analysis to date of the ingredients which, if used in the right country-specific recipe, can deliver growth and help lift populations out of poverty.

This publication discusses the impact of institutions on economic development and the determinants that shape institutional quality, using a new institutional economics (NIE) model based on a multidisciplinary approach to understanding issues including growth, efficiency and income distribution. Using the experience of Argentina under the Menem government as a case study, a methodology is developed and applied to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the concept of institutional quality and how delineation between economic and political institutions work in practice. It also considers systems of democracy and autocracy, and the impact of traditional, legal and cultural frameworks on institutional efficiency.