Do great leaders make history? Or are they compelled to act by historical circumstance? This debate has remained unresolved since Thomas Carlyle and Karl Marx framed it in the mid-nineteenth century, yet implicit answers inform our policies and our views of history. In this book, Professor Bear F. Braumoeller argues persuasively that both perspectives are correct: leaders shape the main material and ideological forces of history that subsequently constrain and compel them. His studies of the Congress of Vienna, the interwar period, and the end of the Cold War illustrate this dynamic, and the data he marshals provide systematic evidence that leaders both shape and are constrained by the structure of the international system.

A truly global account of WWII - the war that encompassed six continents.

This third edition of Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's engrossing history of the Central Intelligence Agency includes a new prologue that discusses the history of the CIA since the end of the Cold War, focusing in particular on the intelligence dimensions of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Praise for the earlier editions: "I have read many books on the CIA, but none more searching and still dispassionate. Nor would I have believed that a book of such towering scholarship could still be so lucid and exciting to read."--Daniel Schorr "This is one of the best short histories of the CIA in print, up-to-date and based on a wide range of sources."--Walter Laqueur "Judicious and reasonable. . . . A sophisticated study that should challenge us to take a more serious view about how our democracy formulates its foreign policy."--David P. Calleo, New York Times Book Review A brief, yet subtle and penetrating, account of the Central Intelligence Agency."--Leonard Bushkoff, Christian Science Monitor "Subtle and crisply written. . . . A book remarkable for its clarity and lack of bias."--William W. Powers, Jr., International Herald Tribune, Paris

American Isolationism Between the World Wars: The Search for a Nation's Identity examines the theory of isolationism in America between the world wars, arguing that it is an ideal that has dominated the Republic since its founding. During the interwar period, isolationists could be found among Republicans and Democrats, Catholics and Protestants, pacifists and militarists, rich and poor. While the dominant historical assessment of isolationism — that it was "provincial" and "short-sighted" — will be examined, this book argues that American isolationism between 1919 and the mid-1930s was a rational foreign policy simply because the European reversion back to politics as usual insured that the continent would remain unstable. Drawing on a wide range of newspaper and journal articles, biographies, congressional hearings, personal papers, and numerous secondary sources, Kenneth D. Rose suggests the time has come for a paradigm shift in how American isolationism is viewed. The text also offers a reflection on isolationism since the end of World War II, particularly the nature of isolationism during the Trump era. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of U.S. Foreign Relations and twentieth-century American history.

Friedrich von Boetticher was Germany's only military attaché accredited to the United States between the world wars. As such, he was Germany's official military observer in the capital of the nation whose potential as an ally of those powers arrayed against Adolf Hitler in the 1930s might have given the dictator pause in any predatory plans he harbored against his neighbors. Though von Boetticher produced a rich and detailed commentary on military and political affairs in Washington in the eight years prior to the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States in 1941, he was nonetheless accused after the war of misjudging America's productive potential and misleading Hitler with overly optimistic reports. As Alfred M. Beck points out, what he actually told German authorities in Berlin is strikingly different from what his detractors later claimed. Von Boetticher "permits a glimpse into the sociology of a conservative officer caste at once assailed by the politics of a regime and the impossibilities imposed on it, its weaknesses in resisting its evils, and its eventual failure to present an alternative to National Socialism's illusory attractions." A loyal German, von Boetticher had strong ties to America. His mother was American-born, he spoke English fluently, and he was enamored of American military history. He was also anti-Semitic and believed that "Jewish wire-pullers" had undue influence over the U.S. government and its policies. His professional ties to U.S. Army officers in the War Department were so strong--supplying them, for example, with details on German air strength and operations during the Battle of Britain in 1940--that they survived until August 1941 and long after the German ambassador himself had been recalled. Torn between his duty to Germany (though the Nazi regime had attempted to harm his son) and his deep affection for America, von Boetticher stood among the broad middle range of German officials who were neither perpetrator nor victim.

This work provides a theoretical and historical examination of the relationship between provision of military assistance and success in achieving donor aims. Eight case studies, which include the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Vietnam War, are examined to assess four prominent features of the donor-recipient relationship: the convergence of donor and recipient aims; donor control; commitment of donor military forces; and coherence of donor policies and strategies. As an essential part of the expanding body of multidisciplinary international scholarship, this book links history and theory to policy and narrows the gap between economics, political science, and military strategy. Each chapter refines the relevant features of the observed donor-recipient relationships into a pattern for comparison with other episodes. The final chapter collects the observations, compares them, and develops a set of uniformities that suggest a prototypical, successful donor-recipient relationship, suitable for direct application as a policy paradigm or for theoretical investigation. Mott suggests that both donor and recipient governments can use military assistance as a deliberate instrument of national policy and military strategy to achieve national aims.

Ever since Commodore Perry sailed into Uraga Channel, relations between the United States and Japan have been characterized by culture shock. Now a distinguished Japanese historian critically analyzes contemporary thought, public opinion, and behavior in the two countries over the course of the twentieth century, offering a binational perspective on culture shock as it has affected their relations. In these essays, Sadao Asada examines the historical interaction between these two countries from 1890 to 2006, focusing on naval strategy, transpacific racism, and the atomic bomb controversy. For each topic, he offers a rigorous analysis of both American and Japanese perceptions, showing how cultural relations and the interchange of ideas have been complex--and occasionally destructive. Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations contains insightful essays on the influence of Alfred Mahan on the Japanese navy and on American images of Japan during the 1920s. Other essays consider the progressive breakdown of relations between the two countries and the origins of the Pacific War from the viewpoint of the Japanese navy, then tackle the ultimate shock of the atomic bomb and Japan's surrender, tracing changing perceptions of the decision to use the bomb on both sides of the Pacific over the course of sixty years. In discussing these subjects, Asada draws on Japanese sources largely inaccessible to Western scholars to provide a host of eye-opening insights for non-Japanese readers. After studying in America for nine years and receiving degrees from both Carleton College and Yale University, Asada returned to Japan to face his own reverse culture shock. His insights raise important questions of why people on opposite sides of the Pacific see things differently and adapt their perceptions to different purposes. This book marks a major effort toward reconstructing and understanding the conflicted course of Japanese-American relations during the first half of the twentieth century.