This book examines the question--are mental processes accessible-- within the context of reviewing the past, present, and desirable future of behaviorism.

This book considers one of the most fundamental, but only infrequently considered, issues in psychology--Are mental processes accessible by means of verbal reports and/or experimental assays? It is argues that this is the main characteristic distinguishing between behaviorism and mentalistic cognitivism. The answer posed by the author is that, with few exceptions and for the most fundamental reasons, mental processes are not accessible and that any psychology, such as contemporary cognitivism, based on a putative analysis of mind into its mental components must be fallacious. Classic and modern arguments against both mentalism and behaviorism are reviewed. In general, it is concluded that most antibehaviorist arguments are based on second order humanistic considerations rather than those underlying the usual scientific standards. Behaviorism represents the best that can be done in a situation of fundamental immeasurability and uncertainty. A modern version is offered in the final chapter of this book.

For many years behaviorism was criticized because it rejected the study of perception. This rejection was based on the extreme view that percepts were internal subjective experiences and thus not subject to examination. This book argues that this logic is incorrect and shows how visual perception, particularized in the study of form recognition, can be carried out from the behavioral point of view if certain constraints and limitations are understood and accepted. The book discusses the idea of representation of forms, considers the major historical neural, psychological, and computational theories of form recognition, and then concludes by presenting a modern approach to the problem. In this book, William Uttal continues his critical analysis of the foundations of modern psychology. He is particularly concerned with the logical and conceptual foundations of visual perception and uses form recognition as a vehicle to rationalize the discrepancies between classic behaviorism and what we now appreciate are legitimate research areas.

Beginning with the claim that the field of educating individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder is hyper focused on behavior analytic methodologies, Eric Shyman proffers a polemic in support of comprehensive educational approaches including relationship-based, sensory, and behavioral components. By tracing the history of the development of behavior analysis, interrogating its connection with Autism Spectrum Disorder, and deeply identifying and exploring the strengths and weaknesses of multiple approaches that have been suggested for individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Shyman argues that for reasons as vast as best practice and social justice, a comprehensive educational approach is the only methodology that could be suitable for the complex and individualized needs presented by individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.

The ability to learn concepts lies at the very core of human cognition, enabling us to efficiently classify, organize, identify, and store complex information. In view of the basic role that concepts play in our everyday physical and mental lives, the fields of cognitive science and psychology face three long standing challenges: discovering the laws that govern concept learning and categorization behavior in organisms, showing how they inform other areas of cognitive research, and describing them with the mathematical systematicity and precision found in the physical sciences. In light of these theoretical and methodological shortcomings, this volume will introduce a set of general mathematical principles for predicting and explaining conceptual behavior. The author’s theory is based on seven fundamental constructs of universal science: invariance, complexity, information, similarity, dissimilarity, pattern, and representation. These constructs are joined by a novel mathematical framework that does not depend on probability theory, and derives key results from conceptual behavior research with other key areas of cognitive research such as pattern perception, similarity assessment, and contextual choice. The result is a unique and systematic unifying foundation for cognitive science in the tradition of classical physics.

Mrs Gribbin invites you to join her as she explores the changing landscape of learning theories and their implications.