A concise, well-written examination by a lawyer-historian of the judicial restraint philosophies of President Truman's four appointees to the Supreme Court: Harold Burton, Fred Vinson, Tom Clark, and Sherman Minton. Rudko's analysis of the four men's opinions in criminal procedure, loyalty-security, racial discrimination, and alien rights cases show that Truman was far more successful than most presidents in choosing justices whose view of the judicial role matched his own. Choice Much of the debate surrounding the Supreme Court can be traced to the notion that the Court is primarily a political rather than a judicial institution. When the Court is viewed from an ideological standpoint, it becomes tempting, for example, to equate judicial restraint with conservatism, and activism with a liberal political perspective. In her study of the Truman Court, Rudko demonstrates the fallacy of the political approach. Focusing of the record of President Truman's four liberal appointees, she looks at the judicial philosophy underlying important decisions involving the rights of individuals and shows how judicial issues--especially the balance between restraint and activism--have determined the decision-making process.

Drawing on economic and political theory, legal analysis, and his own extensive judicial experience, Posner sketches the history of the federal courts, describes the contemporary institution, appraises concerns that have been expressed with their performance, and presents a variety of proposals for both short-term and fundamental reform.

Presents studies of the Supreme Court arranged in chronological stages. Each of these stages constitutes a chapter in which the authors systematically analyze the Court's control of its docket, the justices' initial vote on the merits of the cases it has agreed to decide, how majority opinions are assigned, the explanation for the final vote on the merits, the writing and joining of special (non- majority) opinions, and the Court's output. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

This book critically examines the evolving global trend of judicial activism with particular reference to Bangladesh. It constructs judicial activism as a golden-mean adjudicative technology, standing between excessive judicial assertion and unacceptable judicial passivity that may leave injustices un-redressed. It argues that judicial balancing between over-activism and meek administration of justice should essentially be predicated upon domestic conditions, and the needs and fundamental public values of the judges’ respective society. Providing cross-jurisdictional empirical evidence, the study demonstrates that judicial activism, steered towards improving justice and grounded in one’s societal specificities, can be exercised in a morally and legally legitimate form and without rupturing the balance of powers among the state organs. This study has sought to displace the myth of judicial activism as constitutional transgression by “unelected” judges, arguing that judicial activism is quite different from excessivism. It is argued and shown that a particular judge or judiciary turns out to be activist when other public functionaries avoid or breach their constitutional responsibilities and thus generate injustice and inequality. The study treats judicial activism as the conscientious exposition of constitutional norms and enforcement of public duties of those in positions of power. The study assesses whether Bangladeshi judges have been striking the correct balance between over-activism and injudicious passivity. Broadly, the present book reveals judicial under-activism in Bangladesh and offers insights into causes for this. It is argued that the existing milieu of socio-political injustices and over-balance of constitutional powers in Bangladesh calls for increased judicial intervention and guidance, of course in a balanced and pragmatic manner, which is critical for good governance and social justice. “Writing about judicial activism easily gets shackled by fussy and pedestrian debates about what judges may or may not do as unelected agents of governance. The book . . . goes much beyond such reductionist pedestrianisation of law, for it courageously lifts the debate into the skies of global legal realism. The analysis perceptively addresses bottlenecks of justice, identifying shackles and mental blocks in our own minds against activising concerns for justice for the common citizen.” —Prof Werner Menski (Foreword)