Nearly 1.9 million U.S. troops have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since October 2001. Many service members and veterans face serious challenges in readjusting to normal life after returning home. This initial book presents findings on the most critical challenges, and lays out the blueprint for the second phase of the study to determine how best to meet the needs of returning troops and their families.

The United States Army in Afghanistan is a powerful story of the first military efforts to strike back at the terrorist organization al Qaeda in the aftermath of its 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Al Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden, believed he and his followers living and training under the protection of the Taliban regime in the far-off mountains of Afghanistan were beyond the reach of American arms. Richard W. Stewart in his penetrating essay on the early critical months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM proves that bin Laden was wrong, chronicling how American, coalition, and allied Afghan units in a matter of months overthrew the Taliban regime and drove the al Qaeda into worldwide flight. His well-balanced story of American resolve, of danger and hardship, and of ultimate victory during the opening days of the Global War on Terrorism is worthy of study, providing critical perspective on how conventional and unconventional forces not only complemented each other's strengths but also compensated for each other's weaknesses.

Background : "Operation Enduring Freedom" -- Violations by U.S. forces -- International legal context -- Conclusions -- Recommendations -- Appendix : U.S. criticisms of mistreatment and torture practices -- Acknowledgments.

Based on hundreds of oral interviews and unclassified documents, this study offers a comprehensive chronological narrative of the first four years of Operation Enduring Freedom.

"The purpose of this book is to share Army special operations soldier stories with the general American public to show them what various elements accomplished during the war to drive the Taliban from power and to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan as part of the global war on terrorism. The purpose of the book is not to resolve Army special operations doctrinal issues, to clarify or update military definitions, or to be the 'definitive' history of the continuing unconventional war in Afghanistan. The purpose is to demonstrate how the war to drive the Taliban from power, help the Afghan people, and assist the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) rebuild the country afterward was successfully accomplished by majors, captains, warrant officers, and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews at the lowest levels ... This historical project is not intended to be the definitive study of the war in Afghanistan. It is a 'snapshot' of the war from 11 September 2001 until the middle of May 2002"--Page xv.

The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.