Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.

A senior UN official's account of the war in Bosnia as he experienced it on duty in Sarajevo.

A discussion of the political illusion created by the humanitarian bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 that tests popular beliefs

This book describes the build-up to the Bosnian War, which took place from 1992-95, and the relation it had with the war in Croatia between 1991-95. The Bosnian war is viewed from two different angles. The first one is the perspective from inside the conflict area, describing the war in the field and its effects. The second one is the perspective of international high politics, where former Yugoslavia is just an object in the world power-game. It describes the Bosnian War's four phases (author's definition), the first phase being the Serbs' struggle to keep as much as possible of the disintegrating state, the second phase being the uncontrolled ethnic war, the third phase being that of corruption and stagnation where the war had a life of its own without much real fighting, and the last phase when the dividing lines were redrawn and formal fighting ended, almost like a pre-planned game of chess. The book concludes by a reflection on future developments and problems in the region.

The Kosovo conflict has the potential to redraw the landscape of international politics, with significant ramifications for the UN, major powers, regional organizations, and the way in which we understand and interpret world politics. Can the veto now effectively be circumvented to launch selective enforcement operations? Can the humanitarian imperative be reconciled with the principle of state sovereignty? This book offers interpretations of the Kosovo crisis from numerous perspectives: the conflict-parties, NATO allies, the immediate region surrounding the conflict, and further afield. Country perspectives are followed by scholarly analyses of the longer-term normative, operational, and structural consequences of the Kosovo crisis for world politics.

NATO, an organisation brought together to function as an anti-communist alliance, faced existential questions after the unexpected collapse of the USSR at the beginning of the 1990s. Intervention in the conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 gave it a renewed sense of purpose and a redefining of its core mission. Abe argues that an impetus for this change was the norm dilemma that the conflict in Bosnia represented. On the one hand a state which oversaw the massacre of its civilians was in breach of international norms, but on the other hand intervention by outside states would breach the norms of sovereign integrity and non-use of force. NATO, as an international governance organisation, thus became a vehicle for avoiding this kind of dilemma. A detailed case study of NATO during the Bosnian war, this book explores how the differing views and preferences among the Western states on the intervention in Bosnia were reconciled as they agreed on the outline of NATO’s reform. It examines detailed decision-making processes in Britain, France, Germany and the USA. In particular Abe analyses why conflicting norms led to an emphasis on conflict prevention capacity, rather than simply on armed intervention capacity.