This book argues for a correct balance between risk and reward and for Directors' remuneration to be equitable to all parties and stakeholders. By examining the current theories, practices and regulations and explaining them in detail it provides a state of the art overview of one of the key corporate governance issues of our time.

This book highlights very clearly about corporate governance, practices, failures in different countries, laws, and frameworks, and corporate social responsibility, which helps the focused and broader audience in a better way to understand the above-said aspects. I strongly believe that this book provides ample knowledge to the readers.

Forty years ago, managerialism dominated corporate governance. In both theory and practice, a team of senior managers ran the corporation with little or no interference from other stakeholders. Shareholders were essentially powerless and typically quiescent. Boards of directors were little more than rubber stamps. Today, the corporate governance landscape looks vastly different. The fall-out from the post-Enron scandal and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have resulted in shareholder activism becoming more widespread, while many observers call for even greater empowerment. The notion that the board of directors is a mere pawn of top management is increasingly invalid, and as a result, modern boards of directors typically are smaller than their antecedents, meet more often, are more independent from management, own more stock, and have better access to information. The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice offers an interdisciplinary analysis of the emerging board-centered system of corporate governance. It draws on doctrinal legal analysis, behavioral economic insights into how individuals and groups make decisions, the work of new institutional economics on organizational structure, and management studies of corporate governance. Using those tools, Stephen Bainbridge traces the process by which this new corporate governance system emerged, and explores whether such changes are desirable or effective.

Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance explains how the real world of corporate governance works. It offers new definitions of governance and new conceptual models for investigating governance and corporate behaviour, based on both practical experience and academic investigation. In examining the historical development of corporate governance, it integrates issues of company law, regulatory practice and company administration with contemporary corporate governance policies and structures. An extensive range of international examples, both recent and historical, is used to compare theoretical explanations of governance behaviour with practical outcomes. This book will be particularly suitable for students taking an ICSA-accredited course - giving a necessary critical view on governance, law and regulation - and will also be suitable for accountancy courses. Through utilising new conceptual models, it will stimulate debate among both theorists and practitioners looking to develop their expertise.

The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Modern businesses and organizations understand that corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an important factor for sustainable success. At the same time CSR has established itself as a widely accepted element of courses in managerial training and education. This book, designed to support CSR teaching, collects 14 essays that clearly illustrate and explain the benefits and challenges of socially responsible corporate policies. Aligning theory and practice, the book focuses on four central themes: management, environment and sustainability, corporate social responsibility, and accounting and financial reporting. Business students and experienced managers alike will find this book a valuable resource that helps them to discover the strong forces that link successful management with corporate social responsibility.

This book investigates the pre-crisis practice of bankers' remuneration in the UK to provide evidence of the problems in practice. It critically analyses the regulatory initiatives implemented after the crisis and investigates the post-crisis practice to reflect the effects and problems of the regulation. The book also discusses the traditional administration of remuneration and political incentives in Chinese banks and the regulatory initiatives for reforming bankers' remuneration. It investigates the recent practices in major Chinese banks to reveal the problems of the regulatory initiatives and the impact of political incentives. It will help academics, researchers, students and practitioners develop a comprehensive understanding of the ongoing reform of bankers' remuneration in the UK and the uniqueness of banks' remuneration systems and incentive mechanisms in China. Furthermore, it provides theoretical insights into the differences between the two jurisdictions in their regulations and practices and the deep-seated reasons for the differences.