The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 has traditionally been seen as a limited conflict between French and German forces. This edited volume challenges this view and shows that it was a war of ideas, values, and perceptions, which transformed the political, diplomatic, and military culture across Europe. Based on interdisciplinary research, the book suggests that the war raised new questions about power, the nation, violence, and notions of civilization, which brought about a decisive shift in how warfare was experienced and perceived. While the Franco-Prussian War may have begun as a traditional dynastic struggle, it became a modern war and an important precursor to the First World War in its use of new weaponry and industrialized warfare. At the same time, the development of humanitarian movements and international law on the conduct of war meant that the fighting was subjected to unprecedented scrutiny, while new technologies accelerated the pace at which narratives about the war were constructed and consumed. This volume will appeal to scholars in the fields of war studies, international relations and diplomacy, and intellectual and cultural history. It will also be a useful addition to undergraduate and postgraduate courses on nineteenth-century European history and cultural studies.

The first edition (1981) took a critical look at the accepted wisdom of historians who interpreted battlefield events primarily by reference to firepower. It showed that Wellington's infantry had won by their mobility rather than their musketry, that the bayonet did not become obsolete in the nineteenth century as is often claimed, and that the tank never supplanted the infantryman in the twentieth. A decade later, the author has been able to fill out many parts of his analysis and has extended it into the near future. The Napoleonic section includes an analysis of firepower and fortification, notably at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. Additional discussions of the tactics of the American Civil War have been included. The evolution of small-unit tactics in the First World War is next considered, then the problem of making an armored breakthrough in the Second World War. Following is a discussion of the limitations of both the helicopter and firepower in Vietnam. The author points to some of the lessons learned by the U.S. military and the doctrine which resulted from that experience. Concluding is a glimpse at the strangely empty battlefield landscape that might be expected in any future high technology conflict.