The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the more widely adhered to syntactic conception. In this book, the author outlines both the conceptions indicating the significant problems with the syntactic conception; explains and criticizes two influential syntactic-conception accounts of the structure of evolutionary theorizing. Thompson also argues that the semantic conception provides a richer and more accurate understanding than the syntactic conception of sociobiological explanation, of the testability of sociobiology, and of the role of culture and cognition in evolutionary explanations of human behavior.

The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the more widely adhered to syntactic conception. In this book, the author outlines both the conceptions indicating the significant problems with the syntactic conception; explains and criticizes two influential syntactic-conception accounts of the structure of evolutionary theorizing. Thompson also argues that the semantic conception provides a richer and more accurate understanding than the syntactic conception of sociobiological explanation, of the testability of sociobiology, and of the role of culture and cognition in evolutionary explanations of human behavior.

The world’s most revered and eloquent interpreter of evolutionary ideas offers here a work of explanatory force unprecedented in our time—a landmark publication, both for its historical sweep and for its scientific vision. With characteristic attention to detail, Stephen Jay Gould first describes the content and discusses the history and origins of the three core commitments of classical Darwinism: that natural selection works on organisms, not genes or species; that it is almost exclusively the mechanism of adaptive evolutionary change; and that these changes are incremental, not drastic. Next, he examines the three critiques that currently challenge this classic Darwinian edifice: that selection operates on multiple levels, from the gene to the group; that evolution proceeds by a variety of mechanisms, not just natural selection; and that causes operating at broader scales, including catastrophes, have figured prominently in the course of evolution. Then, in a stunning tour de force that will likely stimulate discussion and debate for decades, Gould proposes his own system for integrating these classical commitments and contemporary critiques into a new structure of evolutionary thought. In 2001 the Library of Congress named Stephen Jay Gould one of America’s eighty-three Living Legends—people who embody the “quintessentially American ideal of individual creativity, conviction, dedication, and exuberance.” Each of these qualities finds full expression in this peerless work, the likes of which the scientific world has not seen—and may not see again—for well over a century.

Our brain is a fractal structure that can grow thanks to some genes that contain a code, a formula that generates this structure. The basis of evolutionary sociology is that our brain will prompt behavior that is to the benefit of the spreading of our genes. Although people are unaware of it, they generally behave in ways that optimize the reproduction of their genes. Because they need resources from their environment (in the broadest sense of the word), they will show behavior that is conducive to procuring or securing as many resources as possible. To accomplish this mis-sion, people, being social animals, work together. The older parts of our brain (older in an evolutionary sense) make cooperation possible by means of emotion. The younger parts make it possible to formulate rules that reflect these emotions. In other words, these rules derive from factual, biological mechanisms. People experience these rules as “normative,” and as “ethical,” but even so, these rules are products of evolution. We, that is our brains, formulate them because they help our genes to spread. This, in a nutshell, is the biological theory of law as described in this book. Although philosophers of law and even sociobiologists are reluctant to concur that norms can be justified by biological mechanisms, this is what it takes to make a major step forward in the integration of biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law.This book is a legalist's implicit answer to the ideas of Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, Richard Alexander, James Q. Wilson, Daniel Dennet, Matt Ridley, Frans de Waal, and other sociobiologists. By introducing fractals and important aspects of law, it further enhances our insights in human behavior. Free riders by heart use law to improve their reproduction, and thus feel happy.

Preface p. ix Chapter 1 Biology and Its Philosophy p. 2 1.1 The Rise of Logical Positivism p. 2 1.2 The Consequences for Philosophy p. 4 1.3 Problems of Falsifiability p. 6 1.4 Philosophy of Science Without Positivism p. 8 1.5 Speculation and Science p. 10 Introduction to the Literature p. 11 Chapter 2 Autonomy and Provincialism p. 13 2.1 Philosophical Agendas versus Biological Agendas p. 13 2.2 Motives for Provincialism and Autonomy p. 18 2.3 Biological Philosophies p. 21 2.4 Tertium Datur? p. 25 2.5 The Issues in Dispute p. 30 2.6 Steps in the Argument p. 34 Introduction to the Literature p. 35 Chapter 3 Teleology and the Roots of Autonomy p. 37 3.1 Functional Explanations in Molecular Biology p. 39 3.2 The Search for Functions p. 43 3.3 Functional Laws p. 47 3.4 Directively Organized Systems p. 52 3.5 The Autonomy of Teleological Laws p. 59 3.6 The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Functional Explanation p. 62 3.7 Functional Explanation Will Always Be with Us p. 65 Introduction to the Literature p. 67 Chapter 4 Reductionism and the Temptation of Provincialism p. 69 4.1 Motives for Reductionism p. 69 4.2 A Triumph of Reductionism p. 73 4.3 Reductionism and Recombinant DNA p. 84 4.4 Antireductionism and Molecular Genetics p. 88 4.5 Mendel's Genes and Benzer's Cistrons p. 93 4.6 Reduction Obstructed p. 97 4.7 Qualifying Reductionism p. 106 4.8 The Supervenience of Mendelian Genetics p. 11 4.9 Levels of Organization p. 117 Introduction to the Literature p. 119 Chapter 5 The Structure of Evolutionary Theory p. 121 5.1 Is There an Evolutionary Theory? p. 122 5.2 The Charge of Tautology p. 126 5.3 Population Genetics and Evolution p. 130 5.4 Williams's Axiomatization of Evolutionary Theory p. 136 5.5 Adequacy of the Axiomatization p. 144 Introduction to the Literature p. 152 Chapter 6 Fitness p. 154 6.1 Fitness Is Measured by Its Effects p. 154 6.2 Fitness As a Statistical Propensity p. 160 6.3 The Supervenience of Fitness p. 164 6.4 The Evidence for Evolution p. 169 6.5 The Scientific Context of Evolutionary Theory p. 174 Introduction to the Literature p. 179 Chapter 7 Species p. 180 7.1 Operationalism and Theory in Taxonomy p. 182 7.2 Essentialism--For and Against p. 187 7.3 The Biological Species Notion p. 191 7.4 Evolutionary and Ecological Species p. 197 7.5 Species Are Not Natural Kinds p. 201 7.6 Species As Individuals p. 204 7.7 The Theoretical Hierarchy of Biology p. 212 7.8 The Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory p. 216 7.9 Universal Theories and Case Studies p. 219 Introduction to the Literature p. 225 Chapter 8 New Problems of Functionalism p. 226 8.1 Functionalism in Molecular Biology p. 228 8.2 The Panglossian Paradigm p. 235 8.3 Aptations, Exaptations, and Adaptations p. 243 8.4 Information and Action Among the Macromolecules p. 246 8.5 Metaphors and Molecules p. 255 Bibliography p. 266 Index p. 273.

This book examines sociobiology's validity and significance, using the sociobiological theory of the evolution of mating and parenting as an example. It identifies and discusses the array of factors that determine sociobiology's effort to become a science, providing a rare, balanced account—more critical than that of its advocates and more constructive than that of its critics. It sees a role for sociobiology in changing the way we understand the goals of evolutionary biology, the proper way to evaluate emerging sciences, and the deep structure of scientific theories. The book's premise is that evolutionary biology would not be complete if it did not explain evolutionarily significant social facts about nonhumans and humans. It proposes that explanations should be evaluated in terms of their basis in underlying theories, research programs, and conceptual frameworks.