"The convergence of the Three Block War and Network Centric Warfare has led to renewed importance and significance of individual actions on the battlefield, the rebirth of the Strategic Corporal for 21st Century warfare if you will. The nexus of the Three Block War, Network Centric Warfare, and the Strategic Corporal have been put to the test in Iraq. In the fight for Fallujah, the small unit leader emerged as a center of gravity. His ability to affect the tactical level had strategic implications. To maximize the positive effects of these small unit leaders, the Marines developed their strategy to integrate the Three Block War principles with Network Centric Warfare concepts. They used the training concepts developed for the Three Block War and augmented them with the equipment developed for Network Centric Warfare. The result was tantamount to a human network centered on the small unit leader, the Strategic Corporal."--Executive summary, page i.

"In 1999 General Charles Krulak introduced to the United States Marine Corps the concept of the strategic corporal in the widely read essay 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.' General Krulak indicated that, given the modern battlefield's new character, the actions of a Marine corporal have strategic impact. Over the last decade, the term strategic corporal became mythologized within the military culture; forever associated with negative consequences. Leaders now are concerned with the perceived risk to a strategic outcome emanating from the lowest of levels. In an effort to manage this perceived risk, senior leaders have elevated decision authorities far away from anyone but themselves. A thorough analysis of a series of contemporary historical case studies debunks the myth of the strategic corporal and demonstrates that tactical level incidents alone do not alter the strategic outcome of a conflict. The conclusion of this paper restores balance and demonstrates errors in policy or strategic level decisions ultimately affect the outcome of an operation and because the strategic corporal is a myth, recommends joint and service doctrine must be purged while reinforcing the essential elements of mission command. "--Abstract

This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts-their skills and their resources-toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders' abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.

For the ordinary soldier, the non-commissioned officer and the junior officer—the large proportion of the lower strata in military organisations—the expectations of levels of responsibility and decision-making are rapidly increasing. In 1999, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak addressed this in his essay ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War’, which described the range of challenges likely to be faced by marines on the modern battlefield and where a range of operations (fighting, peace works and humanitarian assistance) might occur simultaneously within a very limited precinct (three blocks). The chapters in this book use the metaphor of the ‘strategic corporal’ to focus on the demands facing junior leaders in military operations in the twenty-first century, and what might be done to enhance their ability to respond to them. The circumstances in which these decisions are made need to be better understood, by soldiers and their critical onlookers, be they villagers on the scene, senior military or political leaders remote from the operation, or anti-war activists thousands of miles away. Being ‘strategic’ is not just about a soldier’s professional mastery. Increasingly it also means a genuine familiarity with legal and ethical issues, and an ability in low-intensity conflict to understand local culture and communicate with those in villages and neighbourhoods whose goodwill, or at least neutrality, are vital to ultimate success. In the non-war circumstances in which many Western militaries operate, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as peacekeeping operations, it means dealing with civil authorities in the distribution of aid or even the administration of justice if local institutions have broken down. Sometimes it involves negotiation and mediation. It may even mean having an understanding of the ways pervasive modern media works, and its potential to surveil—and sometimes derail—a mission. Sometimes it also means having a better understanding of the challenges that face the soldier’s own defence force: including the malign effects of bureaucratic inertia and the ‘outsourcing’ of key capabilities to private contractors. The book combines theoretical discussions with practical examples, but it is not—as so many books about future conflict are—a discussion of the technology of future war. Rather, it provides opportunities for specialists in a range of security-related fields to consider the issues and challenges of military leadership, the role of civilians and contractors, the importance of International Humanitarian Law, and even whether strategic gains can be made without the deployment of troops (‘strategic corporals’ or otherwise).

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas

This is a study of the Second Battle of Fallujah, also known as Operation Al-Fajr and Operation Phantom Fury. Over the course of November and December 2004, the I Marine Expeditionary Force conducted a grueling campaign to clear the city of Fallujah of insurgents and end its use as a base for the anticoalition insurgency in western Iraq. The battle involved units from the Marine Corps, Army, and Iraqi military and constituted one of the largest engagements of the Iraq War. The study is based on interviews conducted by Marine Corps History Division field historians of battle participants and archival material. The book will be of primary interest to Marines, other service members, policy makers, and the faculty and students at the service schools and academies. Historians, veterans, high school through univeristy history departments and students as well as libraries may be interested in this book as well. With full color maps and photographs.