Al Qaeda declared war on the United States and then successfully attacked us multiple times in 1998 and 2000, culminating with the horrific attack on 9/11. Since then Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and associated groups have maintained their global presence, increased their safe havens, and expanded their influence. They continue to plot attacks against our homeland and our allies and partners around the globe. In an op-ed just a few weeks ago Peter Bergen asserted that, and I quote, "From Aleppo in western Syria to Fallujah in central Iraq, Al Qaeda now controls territory that stretches more than 400 miles across the heart of the Middle East. Indeed, Al Qaeda appears to control more territory in the Arab world than it has done at any time in history." Al Qaeda appears to be a growing threat. These trends are disturbing and lie in stark contrast to the President Obama's wishful narrative that Al Qaeda is on a path to defeat. While the President seeks an end to war on terrorism and is not providing the leadership necessary for our efforts in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda seeks a continued war against the United States and the West. This is the reality, and this is what our policy and strategy must address. To do otherwise puts the United States and our interests across the globe at dire risk.

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist org. than the one that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. The pre-9/11 AQ was akin to a corp., with Osama Bin Laden acting as a CEO issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. It has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. Contents of this report: (1) Background; (2) AQ Origins; (3) Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan; (5) Arabian Peninsula; (6) Iraq; (7) North Africa/Sahel: Islamic Maghreb; Algeria; The Sahel; (8) Somalia; The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab; (9) Radical Islamist Groups in SE Asia: Jemaah Islamiya; Abu Sayyaf Group; (10) AQ¿s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications.

"Using never-before published material, Arabic language sources, and personal interviews from the Middle East, Schanzer examines affiliates in Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen and Iraq. The author also shares research from a fact-finding mission in Iraq, where he interviewed al-Qaeda fighters and one of Saddam Hussein's former intelligence officers."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has recently been more successful than al Qaeda in gaining U.S. terrorist recruits. The authors undertake a demographic profile of individuals drawn to foreign terrorist organizations and find that the affiliates average terrorists recruited by ISIL is younger, less educated, and more likely to be African American/black or Caucasian/white and a U.S.-born citizen.

Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

This book examines the role of terrorist innovation and learning in theory and practice, and in the context of three specific EU case-studies. It is often said that terrorist groups are relatively conservative in character operating in a technological vacuum – relying almost exclusively on bombs and bullets. This observation masks increasing complexity and creativity and innovation within terrorist groups and one of the most distinguishing features of al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations is its propensity for remarkable innovation. This book examines how and why terrorist groups innovate more generally and al-Qaeda-related terrorist plots in Europe more specifically. The starting point for this book was twofold. Firstly to examine the issue of innovation and learning more generically both in theory, within specific themes and within the context of al-Qaeda’s influence on this process. Secondly, this book examines the evolution of specific al-Qaeda-related plots in three specific northern EU states – the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany - where there has been a significant volume of planned, failed and executed terrorist plots. In particular, these case studies explore signs of innovation and learning. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, political violence, security studies and IR in general.