According to common perception, the Federal Republic of Germany supported the formation of the Israeli state for moral reasons--to atone for its Nazi past--but did not play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the historical record does not sustain this narrative. Daniel Marwecki's pathbreaking analysis deconstructs the myths surrounding the odd alliance between Israel and post-war democratic Germany. Thorough archival research shows how German policymakers often had disingenuous, cynical or even partly antisemitic motivations, seeking to whitewash their Nazi past by supporting the new Israeli state. This is the true context of West Germany's crucial backing of Israel in the 1950s and '60s. German economic and military support greatly contributed to Israel's early consolidation and eventual regional hegemony. This initial alliance has affected Germany's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the present day. Marwecki reassesses German foreign policymaking and identity-shaping, and raises difficult questions about German responsibility after the Holocaust, exploring the many ways in which the genocide of European Jews and the dispossession of the Palestinians have become tragically intertwined in the Middle East's international politics. This long overdue investigation sheds new light on a major episode in the history of the modern Middle East.

A new history of the West German-Israeli relationship as these two countries faced terrorism, war, and economic upheaval in a global Cold War environment.

In 1952 the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a treaty with Israel in terms of which the Germans were to pay three billion Deutschmarks in compensation for the murder of Jews by Hitler's regime during the Second World War. This was an extremely large sum at that time considering that Germany was still recovering from the war, but the Israelis felt that Germany owed Israel a financial as well as a moral debt and thus expected further aid and protection. In the early 1960s a secret arms agreement was reached whereby Germany delivered quantities of weapons to Israel, which felt threatened by its Arab neighbours. This was followed by more economic aid. There was enthusiastic moral support by the German public during the Six-Day War and in 1973 Germany was one of the few European countries to allow American weapons to be sent from its territory to Israel, then engaged in the Yom Kippur War. The political status of West Germany gradually increased, however, and this caused it to give greater emphasis to its own national interest. The result was a cooling in the relationship between the two countries. This book examines the reasons that motivated Germany to grant aid to Israel and the change in their relations as the German economy flourished and gained influence in world affairs.

This is both a comprehensive and profound analysis of the German-Israeli relationship during the 1990s and beyond, which tries to answer the question whether it can still be considered a 'special' one. It comprises a thorough examination of the relations in virtually all existing areas of contact between both countries, ranging from high politics to social contacts, public opinion, and media reporting. Hitherto largely unknown aspects, in particular in the sphere of security cooperation, are brought to light, allowing a perspective different from conventional accounts. Far from contenting itself with a mere enumeration of facts, the critical approach taken by the author also highlights both problematic dimensions of and challenges to the relationship.

This book reinterprets the history of German-Israeli relations by examining the policies that East and West Germany implemented towards Israel in the early Cold War from an innovative and multinational angle.