The Spanish labor market is not working: the unemployment rate is structurally very high; wages are not very responsive to labor market conditions, causing a high cyclicality of unemployment; and the labor market is highly dual. Compared with the EU15, Spanish labor market institutions and policies stand out by the structure of its collective bargaining, which occurs mostly at an intermediate level, and by very high severance payments for permanent workers. Based on a quantitative analysis, the paper shows that moving away from the intermediate level of bargaining would go a long way toward bringing the unemployment rate closer to the EU15 average. The key reform needed to reduce the share of temporary workers is reducing employment protection of permanent workers. Substantially reforming the collective bargaining system and reducing the protection of permanent workers are likely to be highly complementary to secure a substantial reduction in the unemployment rate. The recent 2010 labor market reform attempts to address these issues, although its effects are still to materialize.

Imbalances within the euro area have been a defining feature of the crisis. This paper provides a critical analysis of the ongoing rebalancing of euro area “deficit economies” (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) that accumulated large current account deficits and external liability positions in the run-up to the crisis. It shows that relative price adjustments have been proceeding gradually. Real effective exchange rates have depreciated by 10-25 percent, driven largely by reductions in unit labor costs due to labor shedding. While exports have typically rebounded, subdued demand accounts for much of the reduction in current account deficits. Hence, the current account balance of the euro area as a whole has shifted into surplus. Internal rebalancing has come with subdued activity—notably very high unemployment in the deficit economies—and made continued adjustment more difficult. To advance rebalancing further, the paper emphasizes the need for: (1) macroeconomic policies that support demand and bring inflation in line with the ECB’s medium-term price stability objective; (2) continued EMU reforms (banking union) to ensure proper financial intermediation; and (3) structural reforms in product and labor markets to improve productivity and support the reallocation of resources to tradable sectors.

Following a strong showing in early 2011, the economies across Europe now face the prospect of a pronounced slowdown, as global growth has softened, risk aversion has risen, and strains in Europe's sovereign debt and financial markets have deepened, according to this issue of the Regional Economic Outlook for Europe. Downside risks are significant, and a further deepening of the euro area crisis would affect not only advanced Europe, but also emerging Europe, given its tight economic and financial ties. The policy stance in advanced Europe will need to be adapted to reflect the weakening and tense outlook, financial systems strengthened further, and a consistent, cohesive and cooperative approach to monetary union adopted by all euro area stakeholders. The cross-country experience in the past decade in Europe shows the difference that good policies can make in boosting growth, with some European countries having grown rapidly while others have stagnated. Escaping low-growth traps, through broad-based reforms that address macroeconomic imbalances and country-specific structural rigidities, is possible.

This paper argues that Japan’s excessive labor market duality can reduce Total Factor Productivity (TFP) due to a negative impact on non-regular workers’ effort and on firms’ incentives to train them. On the basis of cross-country empirical evidence, the paper proposes some reform options. In particular, our analysis suggests that reducing the difference in employment protection between regular and non-regular workers would substantially reduce labor market duality in Japan. One reform consistent with these findings is the introduction of a Single Open Ended Contract for all newly hired workers. This reform could be complemented by a shift towards a model that combines labor market flexibility and security (“flexicurity”) and by policies aimed at encouraging wage growth.

A clear, analytical and balanced guide to the euro experiment and subsequent crisis that will appeal to a wide readership.

This paper argues that the sharp increase in unemployment in a number of advanced countries during the Great Recession was not just cyclical (the result of a lack of aggregate demand); the degree of adjustment of real wages and the impact this had on labor productivity also played a role. In many countries, post-2007 employment losses were modest, as real wages adjusted when the economy slowed down. But in some countries real wage growth stayed too high for too long. The result was large-scale labor shedding, which boosted labor productivity but also contributed to a sharp rise in unemployment. In this context, the paper discusses the different experiences of the UK (where employment increased) and Spain (where it fell sharply), and finds that almost two thirds of the employment losses in Spain resulted from the failure of real wages to adjust adequately.

The recovery in Europe continues, supported by strong policy action to contain sovereign debt problems in the euro area. In advanced Europe, lingering uncertainties and market pressures make for moderate and unequal growth, creating challenges for macroeconomic and financial sector policies. The REO also sheds light on the governance issues revealed by the crisis, arguing that better policy frameworks, in particular at the euro area level, promise a stronger Europe. For the first time, the REO devotes a separate chapter to the outlook for emerging Europe, where, after a deep recession, an export-led recovery is under way. However, the rebound is uneven across the region, and policymakers face the difficult challenge of dealing with the legacies of the crisis, while not hurting the recovery. Beyond the short term, the REO argues that the region will need to find new growth engines, as the capital inflows-driven and credit-fueled domestic demand boom needs to give way to more balanced growth. Indeed, the REO emphasizes that active fiscal policy and coordinated prudential measures are key to avoiding a repeat of the boom-bust cycle the region has just endured.