Review: "Leading exponent of discourse-centered approach examines social organization of the Shokleng, Gê-speaking peoples of southern Brazil. Author suggests a reading in terms of the problematic of knowledge: the theme of intelligibility and sensibility and their interrelations; logical empiricism and its connection to the world; the attachment of circulating discourse to sensible space; the relation of discourse and power relations; and the relation of discourse to reference"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 57. http://www.loc.gov/hlas/

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Dorothea Frede suggests that this faculty is an 'embarrassment' for Aquinas; to the contrary, the analysis offered in this book argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas's philosophy of mind would be an embarrassment. By means of this faculty of inner sense, Aquinas offers an account of a direct awareness of individuals of natural kinds—referred to by Aquinas as incidental objects of sense—which comprise the principal ontological categories in Aquinas's metaphysics. By using this awareness of individuals of a natural kind, Aquinas can make better sense out of the process of abstraction using the active intellect (intellectus agens). Were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.

"You can either be the victim of your reactions or the master of your mind." Change your thoughts, change your behavior has long been the mantra for the personal growth movement. Yet no matter how hard you try, there are times you can't to stop the mental chatter that leads to needless arguing, tension, frustration, and eventually a numbing process that restricts access to your joy and passion. Why can't you stop the noise? You are under the spell of your over-protective brain. To feel more energy, stimulate creativity, strengthen relationships, and live healthier, more joyful lives, you have be smarter than your brain. Once you know how your brain works, you can consciously choose how you want to feel and act. Knowing how to shift your emotional states at will is the most important factor in achieving success and happiness. Outsmart Your Brain is full of exercises, examples and guidelines that teach you how to tap into your hidden mental powers to make better decisions and establish powerful connections with others. Readers from around the world have shared their success based on the teachings in the first edition of Outsmart Your Brain. THIS EDITION UPDATES THE SCIENCE AND EXPANDS ON THE CONTENT AND EXERCISES. Read this book to... -Become emotionally self-aware-Make good choices when consumed by emotions -Understand what triggers the emotions of others -Improve leadership, coaching, and conflict-resolution skills -Use insight and empathy to inspire engagement, creativity, and results

No Aristotelian doctrine had a greater influence on medieval philosophy and theology than that of the agent, or active, intellect. This influence, however, was mediated by a long tradition of exegesis in which the Greek commentaries of later antiquity played a dominant role. The two commentaries presented here were known to have been influential in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The first is a short treatise called the "De intellectu", attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias; the second a paraphrase of Aristotle's "De anima" (3.4-8) by Themistius, which also includes a major interpretation of "De anima" (3.5), the chapte on the active intellect.