Discusses the first Gulf War, the weapons inspections, and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, all in an effort to protect the region and the world from weapons of mass destruction.

This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.

This title is for everyone who wants to really understand what happened in the run-up to the declaration of war against Iraq, by the one unimpeachable witness.

Charles Duelfer is one of the most senior intelligence officers with on-the-ground experience to have worked in Iraq before, during, and after the Gulf War. His 2004 CIA report is widely renowned as the most authoritative account on how the world was led to believe that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. But until now, Duelfer has never publicly shared his unrivaled expertise on just how the U.S.-Iraq relationship spiraled into a second war, and ultimately into chaos. Hide and Seek is his account -- based on unparalleled access to Iraqi leadership, the White House, and the CIA -- of the long and tragic unraveling of the U.S. relationship with Iraq. This book sees beyond the propaganda and deceits of both sides to tell the story of the miscalculations in assessing Iraq as a threat, why Saddam responded as he did to U.S. demands, and precisely how the U.S. implemented its decision to topple Saddam's regime. No one is better able than Duelfer to see inside the mindsets of the two administrations, with their mismatched priorities, wounded pride, and dangerous ability to bluff and counterbluff.

Features the official report from the bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction--named by President Bush to try to prevent similar policy debacles in Iran and North Korea. It also includes the official speeches, United Nations reports, and declassified government investigation reports that show, step by step, how the United States got the crucial question of arms in Iraq so terribly wrong. The documents show that:  The CIA concluded in 2002 that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs, but in fact Saddam had dismantled them;  American policymakers consistently assumed the worst case: regardless of his denials, if there was intelligence that Saddam might be making weapons of mass destruction then he had them and was hiding them. UN inspectors, by contrast, assumed that thorough inspection and insistence on complete Iraqi documentation could determine what the truth was;  UN inspectors were frustrated by Saddam's refusal to cooperate freely and thwarted by American military impatience just as they thought themselves on the verge of success;  American inspectors sent in after the war in 2003 found no weapons of mass destruction and how they--and Washington insiders--began to question the basis of the prewar intelligence. The New York Times editor and contributor to The 9/11 Investigations (PublicAffairs, 2004) Craig R. Whitney has scoured the documents surrounding the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In The WMD Mirage, he has assembled the most revelatory and pertinent of these. The result is a startling narrative trail that leads readers through the intelligence and misinformation leading into Iraq--and a telling portrait of how the Bush administration, whether deliberately or unintentionally, with scant evidence and largely against the will of the international community, convinced the American people and their few allies of the urgent need for war. A must-read for scholars, voters, and anyone interested in the goings-on in Iraq, the growing threats perceived elsewhere, and the truth behind our frayed international reputation, The WMD Mirage offers the real story of the missing weapons of mass destruction. In offering such a clear-eyed and documented picture of how we got it wrong in Iraq, The WMD Mirage is the first widely-available book that also includes the new conclusions of the Presidential Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.

This book is Ashton Robinson’s unique eye-witness account of the ISG’s operations in Iraq, based at Camp Slayer, in one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces the group’s task was to search for weapons of mass destruction or to account for them if they did not exist. But the ISG discovered so much more. The ISG unintentionally gained a fascinating insight into Saddam’s dictatorship through interviews with most of ‘the Quartet’, Saddam’s senior committee of trusted lieutenants, and uncovered a web of international corruption surrounding Iraq’s erosion of UN sanctions. The author interweaves his daily experiences in Iraq with interviews with Saddam’s men and historical analysis of pre- and post-war Iraq. He explores Australia’s intelligence relationships with allies and also covers the human rights issues in the coalition occupation of Iraq, as well as the development of the insurgency in Iraq and the rise of ISIL. This story is not just about the Iraq War; it’s a rare look into Australia’s allied intelligence relations, and the international politics, intrigue and corruption surrounding the war.