This book is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. General William S. Rosecrans' desire to develop Union--cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland into an effective counter to Confederate cavalry is compared to the results achieved during the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaign was the first major test of the consolidated Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of the cavalry failed to meet expectation in developing intelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and in influencing the outcome of the two day battle. This study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union Cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?" This book concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instruments of their own making, a consolidated cavalry Corps.

This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. General William S. Rosecrans' desire to develop Union--cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland into an effective counter to Confederate cavalry is compared to the results achieved during the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaign was the first major test of the consolidated Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of the cavalry failed to meet expectation in developing intelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and in influencing the outcome of the two day battle. This study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union Cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?" this study concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instruments of their own making, a consolidated cavalry Corps.

This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman’s cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases and focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well equipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental part in the overall campaign.

During the Chickamauga Campaign, General Stanley's two Union cavalry divisions battled Forrest's and Wheeler's cavalry corps in some of the most difficult terrain for mounted operations. The Federal troopers, commanded by Crook and McCook, guarded the flanks of the advance on Chattanooga, secured the crossing of the Tennessee River, then pushed into enemy territory. The battle exploded on September 18 as Col. Minty and Col. Wilder held off a determined attack by Confederate infantry. The fighting along Chickamauga Creek included notable actions at Glass Mill and Cooper's Gap. Union cavalry dogged Wheeler's forces throughout Tennessee. The Union troopers fought under conditions so dusty they could hardly see, leading the infantry through the second costliest battle of the war.

The award-winning Civil War historian examines the actions of Union Cavalry on the first day of the Battle of Chickamauga in this history and tour guide. This volume provides an in-depth study of the two important delaying actions conducted by mounted Union soldiers at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges on the first day of Chickamauga. Much like Eric J, Wittenberg’s “The Devil’s to Pay”: John Buford at Gettysburg—which won the Gettysburg Civil War Roundtable’s 2015 Book Award—this volume combines engaging military history with a detailed walking and driving tour complete with the GPS coordinates. On September, 18, 1863, a cavalry brigade under Col. Robert H. G. Minty and Col. John T. Wilder’s legendary “Lightning Brigade” of mounted infantry made stout stands at a pair of chokepoints crossing Chickamauga Creek. Minty’s small cavalry brigade held off nearly ten times its number by designing and implementing a textbook example of a delaying action. Their efforts thwarted Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg’s entire battle plan by delaying his army’s advance for an entire day. The appendices of this book include two orders of battle, a discussion of the tactics employed by the Union mounted force, and an epilogue on how the War Department and National Park Service have remembered these events. Complete with more than 60 photos and 15 maps by master cartographer Mark Anderson Moore, Holding the Line on the River of Death is a valuable addition to the burgeoning Chickamauga historiography.

Includes 23 plans and diagrams. This thesis examines the use of artillery by the Union Army of the Cumberland during the Battle of Chickamauga on 19 and 20 September, 1863. The thesis methodology is an analysis of the terrain, technology, tactics, organization for combat, and leadership during the battle. This thesis shows that the Union did not employ artillery effectively due to poor organization for combat and failure of leaders to use the weapons systems in accordance with their strengths. The failure to plan for artillery use on 20 September directly led to weakness on the left flank, which the Confederates exploited. The ensuing havoc led Union leaders to attempt to reorganize their artillery structure while in contact with the enemy, leading to predictable failure. This thesis shows the failure of artillery, a branch that was nearing the end of its relevance during the American Civil War due to technological change. As military thinkers today go through the process of redesigning the force, they can use the lessons of the artillery at as an example of the wrong way to employ a force at the end of its life cycle.