Against the backdrop of the new globalized hate speech dynamics, the nature and scope of States' obligations pursuant to international human rights law on prohibiting incitement to hatred have taken on increased importance and have become a controversial issue within multilateral human rights diplomacy. Key questions being posed in the on-going debates over how best to respond to the new wave of hatred include whether the international legal norm against incitement to hatred, as it currently stands, is suitable to address the contemporary challenges of this phenomenon. Alternatively, does it need to be developed further? This book traces the journey of this norm in three analytical domains; its emergence, relevant supranational jurisprudence, and the recent standard-setting attempts within the UN. The book argues that five internal features of the norm had a strong influence on its difficult path within international human rights law.

Provides an explanatory framework for the challenges facing the development of the international norm prohibiting hate speech.

This book conceptualizes the 'prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred' from the perspectives of international and comparative law.

The contributors to this volume consider whether it is possible to establish carefully tailored hate speech policies that are cognizant of the varying traditions, histories and values of different countries. Throughout, there is a strong comparative emphasis, with examples (and authors) drawn from around the world. All the authors explore whether or when different cultural and historical settings justify different substantive rules given that such cultural relativism can be used to justify content-based restrictions and so endanger freedom of expression. Essays address the following questions, among others: is hate speech in fact so dangerous or harmful to vulnerable minorities or communities as to justify a lower standard of constitutional protection? What harms and benefits accrue from laws that criminalize hate speech in particular contexts? Are there circumstances in which everyone would agree that hate speech should be criminally punished? What lessons can be learned from international case law?

Domestic constitutions and courts applying international human rights conventions acknowledge the significance of the mass media for a democratic society, not only by granting special privileges but also by imposing enhanced duties and responsibilities to journalists and media companies. However, the challenges of media convergence, media ownership concentration and the internet have led to legal uncertainty. Should media privileges be maintained, and, if so, how is 'the media' to be defined? To what extent does media freedom as a legal concept also encompass bloggers who have not undertaken journalistic education? And how can a legal distinction be drawn between investigative journalism on the one hand and reporting on purely private matters on the other? To answer these questions, Jan Oster combines doctrinal and conceptual comparative analysis with descriptive and normative theory, and argues in favour of a media freedom principle based on the significance of the media for public discourse.

Against the backdrop of the new globalized hate speech dynamics, the nature and scope of States' obligations pursuant to international human rights law on prohibiting incitement to hatred have taken on increased importance and have become a controversial issue within multilateral human rights diplomacy. Key questions being posed in the on-going debates over how best to respond to the new wave of hatred include whether the international legal norm against incitement to hatred, as it currently stands, is suitable to address the contemporary challenges of this phenomenon. Alternatively, does it need to be developed further? This book traces the journey of this norm in three analytical domains; its emergence, relevant supranational jurisprudence, and the recent standard-setting attempts within the UN. The book argues that five internal features of the norm had a strong influence on its difficult path within international human rights law.

In authoritarian states, the discourse on freedom of speech, conducted by those opposed to non-democratic governments, focuses on the core aspects of this freedom: on a right to criticize the government, a right to advocate theories arid ideologies contrary to government-imposed orthodoxy, a right to demand institutional reforms, changes in politics, resignation of the incompetent and the corrupt from positions of authority. The claims for freedom of speech focus on those exercises of freedom that are most fundamental and most beneficial to citizens - and which are denied to them by the government. But in a by-and large democratic polity, where these fundamental benefits of freedom of speech are generally enjoyed by the citizens, the public and scholarly discourse on freedom of speech hovers about the peripheries of that freedom; the focus is on its outer boundaries rather than at the central territory of freedom of speech. Those borderline cases, in which people who are otherwise genuinely committed to the core aspects of freedom of speech may sincerely disagree, include pornography, racist hate speech and religious bigoted expressions, defamation of politicians and of private persons, contempt of court, incitement to violence, disclosure of military or commercial secrets, advertising of merchandise such as alcohol or cigarettes or of services and entertainment such as gambling and prostitution.